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Over the last decade, concerns regarding potential exposure to
nanomaterials gave rise to substantial new regulation intended to
ensure safe development of nanotechnology applications. This Article
examines the resultant regulatory system through empirical analysis of
trends and patterns in global development of nanotechnology
regulatory initiatives. It argues that rather than a government-driven
process, it was private actors who set the regulatory wheels in motion.
This Article shows that under conditions of scientific uncertainty,
governments lacking technical and scientific knowledge to support
risk-based regulation often leave a regulatory void. Consequently,
businesses apply self-risk-management strategies to fill the gap,
leading the way for public regulation to follow. Thus, it is the
continual interplay between public and private regulations that shapes
the current landscape and drives the regulatory innovation. This
Article further shows that, while formal partnerships are rare, an
informal and self-organized collaboration is occurring through
reciprocal signals of intent and tacit understanding of the internal and
external factors that drive both public and private regulations. It
concludes that, due to some unique aspects of nanotechnology, private
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regulation has (and is likely to continue to have) a prominent role in
regulating nanotechnologies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Today, with over 1,800 nano-enabled consumer products or
product lines already on the market (including textiles, food
packaging, cosmetics, luggage, children's toys, floor cleaners, and
wound dressings),' addressing the possible exposure to nanomaterialS2
has become a subject of increasing regulatory concern. Over the last
decade, many actors worldwide have developed specific regulatory
initiatives to oversee the safety of nanotechnology3 applications under
1. See Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies, All Products, CONSUMER PRODS.
INVENTORY (2014), http://www.nanotechproject.org/cpilproducts/.
2. The term "nanomaterial" is difficult to define. Institutes around the world define
"nanomaterial" and other related terms such as "nano-objects" and "nanostructures" in different
ways. There are no binding definitions in the regulatory context. The various definitions for
nanoscale and nanomaterial proposed so far have mainly sought to identify an inclusive size
range of 1-100 nanometers, that helps to understand the terminology that uses the prefix
"nano." For example, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) definition is a
"material with any external dimension in the nanoscale" (between 1 and 100 nanometers (nm))
"or having internal structure or surface structure in the nanoscale." See Int'l Org. for
Standardization [ISO], Nanotechnologies-Vocabulary-Part 1: Core Terms, ISO/TS 80004-
1:2010 (2010), available at https://www.iso.org/obp/uil#iso:std:iso:ts:80004:-1:ed-1:vl:en. The
European Commission (EC) was the first to publish its recommended definition on
nanomaterials for regulatory purposes in October 2011. See Commission Recommendation of 18
October 2011 . However, as discussed in the paper, the implementation of this definition is still
problematic due to technical constraints.
3. There is a great variety of technologies for manipulating materials in the nanoscale,
all of which are coined "nanotechnology" as a generic term. See, e.g., ISO, supra note 2.
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conditions of scientific uncertainty.4 The rise of diverse nanospecific
regulatory arrangements, some of which operate simultaneously at
different scales, created a dense global nanotechnology regulatory
landscape devoid of central coordination. This situation raises
questions regarding the way in which new global regulatory norms are
formed: who the leading actors are, at what level they operate, where
around the world decisions are made, how certain norms gain global
supremacy over others, and whether there are legitimate grounds for
overall governance.
This Article examines the emerging regulatory system through
empirical analysis of trends and patterns and the interaction between
public and private regulations. In doing so, it discusses the
underlying drivers of regulation as well as its regional distribution,
highlighting differences in regulatory approaches, tools, and scope
worldwide. An understanding of past and current trends in
nanotechnology regulation can provide some insight into the future of
nanotechnology regulation and the challenges it must face. It may
also serve as a case study for understanding modern regulatory
dynamics in areas of scientific uncertainty.
This Article contributes to the growing literature studying the
fragmentation of global governance by highlighting the role of private
regulation in shaping global regulatory systems under conditions of
scientific uncertainty.5 It raises several observations and arguments.
4. This Article uses the term "scientific uncertainty" to mean the general inability to
make reliable scientific predictions of events or damages. See EUROPEAN SCI. & TECH.
OBSERVATORY, ON SCIENCE AND PRECAUTION IN THE MANAGEMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL RISK 12
(Andrew Stirling, ed. 2001) [hereinafter ESTO, ON SCIENCE], available at
http://ftp.jrc.es/EURdoc/eurl9056Ilen.pdf. The author includes complex and ambiguous scientific
conditions under the umbrella of this term. Scientific complexity refers to the cognitive
component of risks that provide specific constraints and challenges for data collection and
interpretation. It is characterized by a major scientific dispute about complex dose-effect
relationships or the alleged effectiveness of measures to reduce vulnerability. ORTWIN RENN,
RISK GOVERNANCE: COPING WITH UNCERTAINTY IN A COMPLEX WORLD 178, 192 (2008). Scientific
ambiguity is characterized by intense controversy among different stakeholders in society about
the interpretation of risk information and the values and priorities of what should be protected.
Id. at 179.
5. The main focus of the literature has been on public regulatory arrangements as the
center and driver of regulatory systems and interactions. See, e.g., THOMAS GEHRING &
SEBASTIAN OBERTHOR, Interplay: Exploring Institutional Interaction, in INSTITUTIONS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: PRINCIPAL FINDINGS, APPLICATIONS, AND RESEARCH FRONTIERS 187
(Oran R. Young et al. eds., MIT Press 2008); Kenneth. W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal,
Strengthening International Regulation through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the
Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 501, 503 (2009); Robert 0. Keohane & David G.
Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate Change 2 (Harvard Project on Int'l Climate Agreements,
Discussion Paper No. 10-33, 2010), available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edulfiles/
KeohaneVictorFinal_2.pdf. More recent exceptions include, for example, Peer Zumbansen,
Neither 'Public' Nor 'Private, 'National' Nor 'International': Transnational Corporate Governance
from a Legal Pluralist Perspective, 38 J. LAW & SOC. 50 (2011); Graeme Auld & Jessica F. Green,
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First, in the case of nanotechnology regulation, it was private actors
who set in motion the regulatory "wheels" rather than a
government-driven process. Under conditions of scientific
uncertainty, governments lack the technical and scientific knowledge
to support risk-based regulation, and are often satisfied with results
from minimal data-collection requirements. However, this has left a
significant gap in regulation. Consequently, businesses apply
self-risk-management strategies to fill that gap, leading the way for
public regulation to follow. The continual interplay between public
and private regulation is what shapes the current landscape and
drives regulatory innovation.
Second, while formal partnerships are rare, informal
collaboration frequently occurs through reciprocal signals of intent
and tacit understanding of the internal (organizational) and external
(social, economic, and political) factors that drive both public and
private regulations. Given this dynamic, it is clear that the
public-private interplay does not result from a governmental strategy
or orchestration as commonly argued,6 but instead is self-organized.
Third, under conditions of scientific uncertainty, businesses opt
to go beyond compliance for two main reasons. One reason is that, in
unregulated domains, businesses have incentives to influence future
regulatory requirements.7  In this way, they are able to avoid
being faced with overly burdensome regulations and can reduce the
risk of policy divergence among jurisdictions. Secondly, scientific
uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity regarding the technological
risks pressure businesses to apply multiple strategies concurrently for
addressing new risks and uncertainties. This may include going
beyond compliance as a way to build public trust and regulatory
support.
This Article concludes with the author's view that, due to some
unique aspects of nanotechnology, including the diversity and
complexity of nanobased materials, the pace of innovation, and
information asymmetry, private regulation is likely to continue
to have a prominent role in the future. Unlike traditional
command-and-control regulation, which is a "one size fits all"
approach, private regulation can more easily accommodate differences
in materials and manufacturing processes, thus allowing the
Unbundling the Regime Complex: The Effects of Private Authority (Osgoode CLPE, Research
Paper No. 15/2012, 2012), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2116296.
6. See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (Oxford Univ. Press 1992); Abbott & Snidal, supra
note 5.
7. This incentive may be limited by the resources the firm has to invest in the
voluntary program and the shield to liability it can get for such activity.
1112014]
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regulation to be more specific, relevant, and proportionate. Private
arrangements, when implemented, also often allow greater flexibility
(addressing scientific and regulatory gaps with professional
judgment), and can therefore incorporate new knowledge regarding
potential risks more quickly.
Part II of this Article briefly outlines the relevant conceptual
framework. Part III describes the methodology used by the author to
create the Global Nanotechnology Regulatory Initiative (GNRI)
database. Part IV is an overview of the results of an analysis of this
database. Part V then discusses trends in the GNRI evolution in more
depth, analyzing the major social-economic and political factors
influencing these trends, including the cultural differences in
environmental health and safety (EHS) risk perception and risk
regulation across the globe. Part VI concludes this Article with
insights about the future of nanotechnology regulation and its
challenges, highlighting the need for further investigation of private
authorities' role in shaping global nanotechnology regulatory norms.
II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
This Article examines the empirical data8 using three
theoretical prisms, which jointly and severally help explain the
observed global trends in nanotechnology regulation. The first prism,
risk governance under scientific uncertainty, will provide the overall
context in which nanotechnology is being developed and regulated.
The second theoretical lens is proposed by the greening of industry,
which seeks to explain the motivations of private firms to go beyond
compliance and develop regulation that specifically addresses the
environmental and human health implications of nanotechnologies.
The third theoretical lens, discussing the fragmentation of global
governance, provides a perspective for understanding the proliferation
of decentralized nanotechnology regulatory initiatives globally, and
the diversity of institutions involved in setting regulation. These
theoretical prisms contextualize the regulatory situation in which
nanotechnology regulation is being developed and for understanding
the other two regulatory phenomena, greening and fragmentation,
that are observed in the field.
8. See discussion infra Part III.
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A. Risk Management Under Conditions of Scientific Uncertainty
Risk management involves reducing risks to a level deemed
acceptable by society.9 The literature often refers to three main
strategies for managing technological risks:10
(1) Risk-based approach. Identifies potential physical harm to
human beings or ecosystems and analyzes the probability
that these events will occur over space and time."
Typically, once such risks are severe enough to justify
government intervention, qualitative safety goals, exposure
limits, or standards are established to minimize the risks.
However, under conditions of scientific uncertainty,
establishing these measures becomes challenging. The
effectiveness of this approach lies in its ability to acquire
the necessary data for the risk evaluation process.
(2) Precautionary-based approach. Justifies regulatory
intervention based on a scientific conclusion of a "realistic
and serious risk" to society (and thereby lowers the burden
of proof of adverse effects).12  Typically, under this
approach, regulation adopts "activity reduction" measures
such as production limits through permits, control banding,
exposure limit standards set at "as low as reasonably
achievable" (ALARA),1 3 and constant monitoring of the
potentially harmful side effects.
(3) Discursive-based approach. Frames the risks and decides
on the means to address them through roundtables,
mediation, citizen panels or other deliberative processes
that engage multiple stakeholders. The regulatory outcome
of such an approach often includes self-enforced codes of
conduct aimed at strengthening the long-term
9. See RENN, supra note 4, at 185.
10. See, e.g., ESTO, ON SCIENCE, supra note 4; Andreas Klinke & Ortwin Renn, A New
Approach to Risk Evaluation and Management: Risk-Based, Precaution-Based, and Discourse-
Based Strategies, 22 RISK ANALYSIS 1071 (2002).
11. See Ortwin Renn, Concepts of Risk: A Classification, in SOCIAL THEORIES OF RISK,
53, 59 (Sheldon Krimsky & Dominic Golding eds., 1992).
12. The absence of quantifiable scientific proof of risk does not preclude the possibility
for real risk, and therefore cannot be used to justify regulatory inaction under the general duty
to refrain from actions that would cause harm to others. See generally PROTECTING PUBLIC
HEALTH & THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (Carolyn
Raffensperger & Joel A. Tickner, eds. 1999); Communication from the Commission on the
Precautionary Principle COM (2000) 1 final (Feb. 2, 2002) [hereinafter, Commission on the
Precautionary Principle], available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/library/pub/
pub07_en.pdf.
13. Commission on the Precautionary Principle, supra note 12, at 15.
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responsibility of the regulated entity and international
coordination.
Choosing among these strategies depends on the type of risk
problem addressed-problems can range from a routine risk, which
can be addressed through traditional cost-benefit analysis, to a risk
with scientific complexity, unresolved scientific uncertainty, or
scientific ambiguity requiring a strategy more tailored to the specific
conditions.14 For example, Renn notes that because the main obstacle
of managing complex risk is obtaining the best information to resolve
the complexity in a scientific and reliable way, the regulatory
approach should be expert deliberation-what he terms "epistemic
discourse." On the other hand, highly uncertain risks cannot be
resolved through more sophisticated scientific data; they require the
employment of proxy variables that refer to the nature of the risk in
question. In addition, resilience strategies and the development of
substitutes should be adopted. Finally, because the main problem
with managing ambiguous risks is reaching consensus on the content,
regulatory strategy should focus on ways and means to prioritize the
objectives and the regulatory options that are acceptable for most
stakeholders in society.15
In the context of nanotechnology, however, the line between
one type of risk problem and another is not always clear; thus, the
optimal regulatory strategy to address such risks is value-laden. The
literature on risk governance acknowledges both the value-laden
component of risk management and the fact that regulatory
intervention to oversee technological risks may vary between fields,
countries, and individuals, depending on their risk conception and
their construction of the "risk object"16 that requires control. A good
illustration for this point is the international debate over the
regulation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in food. The
literature documents that the European Union (EU) objections to
biotechnology are based not only on the potential health risk (physical
harm) that this technology might cause but also on cultural, ethical,
religious, ideological, and competitive grounds.1 7
14. RENN, supra note 4, at 177-80.
15. Id. at 191-200.
16. A "risk object" is a socially-constructed definition that frames the scope of what
constitutes a risk for regulatory purposes. . The existence of a risk object justifies the regulatory
intervention to control its impact on society, and the way it is defined determines how it should
be managed. Id.
17. In the absence of sufficient scientific indications of a realistic and serious risk posed
by these products to human health or the environment (an a priori requirement to invoke the
precautionary principle), other grounds eventually led the EU legislators to impose a de facto
moratorium on GMO food. Thus, it was not a precautionary principle decision per se, rather a
114 [Vol. 17:1:107
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Similar to GMOs, nanotechnology-enabled applications also
raise societal, legal, and ethical concerns, including issues of privacy,
human enhancement, intellectual property, and international
power-relationships.'I To avoid the implications of the transatlantic
policy divergence over GMO regulation, which includes significant
technological development barriers, both public and private actors
have changed their traditional strategy.
B. The Greening of Industry: Moving Beyond Compliance
For many years, industrial businesses regarded environmental
regulation as an unjustified economic burden that threatened their
profitability and competitiveness. However, over the last two decades,
leading businesses began viewing environmental reputation as a
strategic business case. The move towards "greening" was justified by
cost-reduction, competitive advantage, and reputational enhancement
in the eyes of regulators and the public.19 Gradually, businesses also
shifted from talking about environmental management and pollution
prevention to talking about sustainability and environmental
stewardship, indicating a more proactive approach that goes beyond
simply avoiding negative consequences.20 Hence, regardless of the
multi-faceted decision not to support the development of such technology. See, e.g., SHEILA S.
JASANOFF, DESIGNS ON NATURE: SCIENCE AND DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES
(2005); Yann Devos et al., Ethics in the Societal Debate on Genetically Modified Organisms: A
(Re)Quest for Sense and Sensibility, 21 J. AGRIC. & ENVTL. ETHICS 29 (2007); Aarti Gupta, When
Global is Local: Negotiating Safe Use of Biotechnology, in EARTHLY POLITICS: LOCAL AND GLOBAL
IN ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 127-48 (Sheila Jasanoff & Marybeth Long Martello eds.,
2004); Chaia Heller, From Scientific Risk to Paysan Savoir-Faire: Peasant Expertise in the
French and Global Debate Over GM Crops, 11 SCI. AS CULTURE 5 (2002); Brian Wynne, Creating
Public Alienation: Expert Cultures of Risk and Ethics on GMOs, 10 SCI. AS CULTURE 445 (2001).
18. For a further discussion on societal and ethical implications of nanotechnology, see
WHAT CAN NANOTECHNOLOGY LEARN FROM BIOTECHNOLOGY?: SOCIAL AND ETHICAL LESSONS FOR
NANOSCIENCE FROM THE DEBATE OVER AGRIFOOD BIOTECHNOLOGY AND GMOs (Kenneth H.
David & Paul B. Thompson eds., 2008); Bruce V. Lewenstein, What Counts as a 'Social and
Ethical Issue' in Nanotechnology, in NANOTECHNOLOGY CHALLENGES: IMPLICATIONS FOR
PHILOSOPHY, ETHICS AND SOCIETY 201 (Davis Baird & Joachim Schummer eds., 2006).
19. See ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGIES FOR INDUSTRY 3 (Johan Schot & Kurt Fischer eds.,
1993) (discussing the evolutionary process of industry's greening); Robert A. Kagan et al.,
Explaining Corporate Environmental Performance: How Does Regulation Matter?, 37 LAW &
SOC'Y REV. 51 (2003) (explaining the external and internal shapers of corporate environmental
behavior); Aseem Prakash, Why do Firms Adopt 'Beyond-compliance'Environmental Policies?, 10
BUs. STRATEGY & THE ENV'T 286 (2001); Forest Reinhardt, Market Failure and the
Environmental Policies of Firms: Economic Rationales for "Beyond Compliance" Behavior, 3 J.
INDUS. ECOLOGY. 9 (1999) (arguing that environmental practices can be used as part of the firm's
overall business strategy).
20. See DANIEL J. FIORINO, THE NEW ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 90-116 (2006)
(discussing the overall logic and trends); NEIL A. GUNNINGHAM ET AL., SHADES OF GREEN:
BUSINESS, REGULATION, AND ENVIRONMENT (2003) (discussing beyond-compliance in terms of a
socially constructed "license to operate"); Jennifer Howard-Grenville et al., Constructing the
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
motivations, many businesses now advance environmental practices
with no direct government pressure.
Several factors influence businesses to go beyond compliance:
(1) The shadow of regulation. Anticipating the need to comply
with more stringent rules later, businesses are motivated to
address the issue before government sets potentially
inflexible rules.21
(2) Reducing risk and regulatory uncertainty. According to
Fiorino, "Much of the behavior associated with the greening
of industry may be explained as efforts by firms to manage
risk and uncertainty."2 2  Adopting product stewardship
programs or similar mechanisms allows companies to lower
their economic and political liabilities if they can show that
they did their best to prevent the harm. This may also
serve as evidence of their environmental responsibility for
their suppliers.23
(3) Building reputational capital. Participating in voluntary
government programs helps businesses deal with public
pressure and maintain good relationships with regulators.
This, in turn, often grants businesses more flexible
regulatory compliance requirements, such as being at a
lower priority for routine agency inspections, being eligible
to file pollution reports less frequently, or being eligible for
expedited permitting and delisting petition processes.24
(4) Enhancing competitive position. Businesses use their
environmental quality operations, their open relationship
with communities and others, and the environmental
attributes of their products to gain market share and create
a positive public image, which will enhance the company's
long-term business success. In addition, businesses with
greater capacities use environmental practices to gain a
first-mover advantage over their competitors that have
License to Operate: Internal Factors and Their Influence on Corporate Environmental Decisions,
30 LAW & POL'Y 73 (2008); Michael E. Porter & Claas van der Linde, Toward a New Conception
of the Environment-Competitiveness Relationship, 9 J. EcON. PERSP. 97 (1995) (raising the
argument of the economic-environmental relationship's win-win situation).
21. See, e.g., FIORINO, supra note 20, at 108, 113; Kagan et al., supra note 19, at 88;
Porter & van der Linde, supra note 20, at 111; Reinhardt, supra note 19, at 13.
22. FIORINO, supra note 20, at 112.
23. See, e.g., id. at 105; FOREST L. REINHARDT, DOWN To EARTH: APPLYING BUSINESS
PRINCIPLES TO ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT (2000); David Dana, When Less Liability May
Mean More Precaution: The Case of Nanotechnology, 28 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 153, 154-55
(2010).
24. See, e.g., FIORINO, supra note 20, at 113-15; Howard-Grenville et al., supra note 20,
at 86; Kagan et al., supra note 19, at 74-75.
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fewer capacities. By making the first move, lead firms can
unilaterally influence government policy choice. In turn,
this change in regulatory status quo (and the adoption of
higher standards) raises the cost of entry for their rivals.25
(5) Internal managerial factors. Corporate culture, mediated
by available corporate financial resources, influences
management decisions on environmental policy. Kagan et
al. constructed five "ideal" management categories
that display incrementally more dedication to
compliance (or beyond compliance) with regulatory
requirements-environmental laggards, reluctant
compliers, committed compliers, environmental strategists,
and true believers.26 Later on, Howard-Grenville et al.
identified five internal organizational factors that shape
businesses' environmental practices: ''managerial
incentives, organizational culture, organizational identity,
organizational self-monitoring, and personal affiliations
and commitments . . . ."27
Part V examines some of the drivers for businesses to go
beyond compliance in the field of nanotechnology regulation
considered through the lens of emerging technologies under conditions
of scientific uncertainty. The author found that the most significant
drivers for nanomaterial businesses to go green are the shadow of
regulation, reducing risk, and regulatory uncertainty, and, to a lesser
extent, enhancing competitive position and building reputational
capital. Nevertheless, as no personal interviews were conducted to
gain systematic insight on these drivers, this Article only highlights
those drivers that could be observed in the general data. This
discussion, therefore, does not preclude the influence of additional
drivers.
C. The Fragmentation of Global Governance
A broad body of literature in the legal, international relations,
political science, and sociology disciplines addresses the phenomena of
global governance fragmentation and decentralization under
25. See, e.g., Scott Barrett, Environmental Regulation for Competitive Advantage, 2
Bus. STRATEGY REV. 1 (1991); Chad Nehrt, Maintainability of First Mover Advantages When
Environmental Regulations Differ Between Countries, 23 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 77, 91-93 (1998);
Porter & van der Linde, supra note 20, at 104-05; Reinhardt, supra note 19; Steven C. Salop &
David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 267, 267 (1983); ENVIRONMENTAL
STRATEGIES FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 19.
26. Kagan et al., supra note 19, at 56-58.
27. Howard-Grenville et al., supra note 20, at 75.
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conditions of rising institutional density. The concepts of new
governance28 and legal pluralism29 developed to describe an emerging
governing style that challenges the Westphalian sovereignty of the
state as the exclusive source of norm making. Instead, they highlight
the increasing influence of non-state actors and the blurring of
boundaries between public and private rulemaking. These concepts
imply a shift in the authority to regulate EHS problems from formal
institutions of the state to self-organizing and inter-organizational
networks. Moreover, contrary to the command-and-control
approach-which relies on bureaucratic expertise and applies a "one
size fits all" mandatory ruling and enforcement strategy-these
concepts focus on the engagement of dispersed expertise, decentralized
standard setting and enforcement, and voluntary ruling.30
From a global perspective, this also means that the exercise of
control occurs at multiple levels and has "transnational
repercussions."31  Likewise, the influence of transnational private
decision-making institutions is growing in many areas of regulation at
all levels.32 The consequences of institutional density and multiple,
uncoordinated coexisting regulatory arrangements may be both
negative and positive. For instance, some scholars have emphasized
the potential for competing claims of authority and conflicting
demands or norms.33 On the other hand, others have pointed out that
regulatory diversity may lead to the creation of a more democratic,
tolerant, and creative society.34  Nevertheless, it is important to
28. See, e.g., Orli Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and The Rise of
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004); R. A. W. Rhodes, The
New Governance: Governing Without Government, 44 POL. STUD. 652 (1996); James N. Rosenau,
Governance in the Twenty-first Century, 1 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 13 (1995); Gerry Stoker,
Governance as Theory: Five Propositions, 50 INT'L SOC. SCI. J. 17 (1998).
29. See, e.g., Oren Perez, Legal Pluralism, in OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN
POLITICAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 97-98 (Donald T. Critchlow & Philip R. VanderMeer eds., Oxford
Univ. Press 2012); Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to
Global, 30 SYDNEY L. REV. 375 (2008); Zumbansen, supra note 5.
30. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 5, at 520-23.
31. See Rosenau, supra note 28, at 13, 15.
32. See, e.g., TIM BUTHE & WALTER MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE
PRIVATIZATION OF REGULATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (2011); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan
Snidal, Taking Responsive Regulation Transnational: Strategies for International Organizations,
7 REG. & GOVERNANCE 95, 97 (2013); Oren Perez, International Environmental Law as a Field of
Multi-Polar Governance: The Case of Private Transnational Environmental Regulation, 10 SANTA
CIARA J. INT'L L. 285, 286-87 (2013).
33. See, e.g., Abbott & Snidal, supra note 5, at 542; David M. Trubek & Louise G.
Trubek, New Governance & Legal Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation, 13
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 539, 547 (2007); Tamanaha, supra note 29, at 400.
34. See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems for Coping with Collective Action and
Global Environmental Change, 20 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 550, 552 (2010); Oren Perez,
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empirically study how coexisting regulatory arrangements interact
with one another to assess governance effectiveness and legitimacy in
a certain domain.
In recent years, many scholars have identified steering
mechanisms to promote desired transnational governance. Proposed
concepts range from top-down, state-strategic orchestration to
bottom-up citizen sovereignty. Between these two extremes lies a
third concept, rough consensus and running code, used to describe a
more deliberative experimental process.
The orchestration concept views the government or
inter-governmental organization as the orchestrator that "pursues
public goals by promoting and empowering a network of public,
private-sector, and civil society actors and institutions, all of which are
encouraged to engage in various 'regulatory' (including self-regulatory)
activities."35 Abbott and Snidal specify "a wide range of directive and
facilitative techniques" applied by the state to propel this network.
These include "initiating voluntary and cooperative programs;
convening and facilitating private collaborations; persuading and
providing incentives for firms to self-regulate; building the capacities
of private actors; negotiating regulatory targets with firms; providing
incentives to exceed mandated performance levels; and ratifying or
scaling up successful approaches."36
Another concept views the erosion of the national sovereignty
as an opportunity for the enhancement of "citizen sovereignty"
through "webs of influence."37 According to Braithwaite and Drahos,
"[Plower is not a matter of imposing a sovereign will, but of enrolling
the cooperation of chains of actors." Therefore, cross-national alliances
of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that capture the
imagination of the public in powerful states can strategically influence
the forum in which the global business regulation occurs and can
counter forum-shifting by stronger actors.38 This allows NGOs to
influence the dialogue that builds the regulatory regime through
"defining issues as a concern, creating contracting spaces where
complex interdependency can induce cooperation, constituting
normative commitments, nurturing habits of compliance that are then
institutionalized into bureaucratic routines, [and] communicating
Normative Creativity and Global Legal Pluralism: Reflections on the Democratic Critique of
Transnational Law, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 25, 26, 29 (2003).
35. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 5, at 521.
36. Id. at 511.
37. JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 31 (2000).
38. Id.
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informal praise and shame that are then institutionalized, and
building capacity."39
The final concept proposes a decentralized dynamic in which
the regulator (public, private, or hybrid), drawing on experts
and stakeholders' knowledge, "seek[s] to identify an
evolving-rough-consensus in light of which it will put forward an
experimental draft body of norms. These, in turn, will receive
feedback and remain open to adaptation and change, constituting a
running code."4 0  From this perspective, transnational norms
formation is a process of constant deliberation and consensus-seeking
combined with regulatory instruments for experimentation and
adaptation.41
Over the years, several regulatory models have been proposed
to describe how public and private actors interplay, or should
interplay, in the field of nanotechnology. One seminal work that
served as a model for several nanotechnology regulation scholars is
Ayres and Braithwaithe's
responsive regulation and the
pyramid of regulatory strategies,
which argues for a "symbiosis
between state regulation and self-
regulation."4 2  The pyramid
presents the range of regulatory
strategies (see Figure 1)-from
self-regulation at the bottom,
through supervised or enforced
self-regulation and other forms of
public-private interaction in the
middle, to standard forms of
command-and-control regulation
at the top. With this tool at hand,
the authors argue that regulators
can play a tit-for-tat strategy:
They allow firms to self-regulate
so long as the firms respond with








Figure 1-Pyramid of Regulatory
Strategies
regulator intervenes with stronger
Id. at 32.
Zumbansen, supra note 5, at 69.
Id.










Several scholars adapted this model to the field of
nanotechnology regulation.44 Of particular interest is Marchant et
al.'s model, which attempts to account for the scientifically uncertain
conditions under which nanotechnology regulation is developed. Their
model extends the regulatory pyramid through time, viewing these
strategies as sequential. They propose that, in the near future,
regulation should focus on softer and more decentralized measures,
which will produce the greatest information, coupled with mechanisms
for learning from them. Over time, as society learns about the actual
risks and benefits of nanotechnology from its early experiences, a
more command-and-control based regulatory structure can be
gradually built up.4 5
In reality, as discussed in Part V, there has been no strategic
incremental development of nanotechnology regulation. Rather,
regulation has been a fluid mixture of soft-hard law that evolved
differently in each sector and region of the world based on traditional
regulatory culture and public perception of nanotechnology.
Furthermore, as previously commented in the literature, the pyramid
of regulatory strategies-static or incremental-neither epresents the
activities of both regulated entities and third parties, nor accounts for
the complexity of social engineering in a multifaceted and fragmented
regulatory system.46 It also fails to address a globalized regulatory
system characterized by multiple. regulators (both public and private)
with limited regulatory capacities, jurisdictional authority,
information access, and sanctioning ability.47
Another regulatory model that has been adapted to the field of
nanotechnology is Abbott and Snidal's model of the regulatory
triangle. This model assumes there are three actor groups-states,
businesses, and NGOs-who act as regulators in agenda setting,
negotiation, implementation, monitoring, and enforcement of
44. See, e.g., Diana M. Bowman & Graeme A. Hodge, Nanotechnology: Mapping the
Wild Regulatory Frontier, 38 FUTURES 1060 (2006); David Levi-Faur & Hanna Comaneshter, The
Risks of Regulation and the Regulation of Risks: The Governance of Nanotechnology, in NEW
GLOBAL REGULATORY FRONTIERS IN REGULATION: THE AGE OF NANOTECHNOLOGY 154-55
(Graeme A. Hodge et al. eds., 2007); Gary E. Marchant et al., Risk Management Principles for
Nanotechnology, 2 NANOETHICS 43, 51 (2008).
45. Marchant et al., supra note 44, at 52.
46. See, e.g., Robert Baldwin & Julia Black, Really Responsive Regulation, 71 MOD. L.
REV. 59, 60-61 (2008); Peter N. Grabosky, Inside the Pyramid: Towards a Conceptual Framework
for the Analysis of Regulatory Systems, 25 INT. J. SOC. L. 195, 197 (1997); Oren Perez, Responsive
Regulation and Second-Order Reflexivity: On the Limits of Regulatory Intervention, 44 U.B.C. L.
REV. 743, 745-46 (2011); Colin Scott, Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post
Regulatory State, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION: INSTITUTIONS AND REGULATORY REFORMS
FOR THE AGE OF GOVERNANCE 145-74 (Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur eds., 2004).
47. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 5.
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environmental, health, and safety standards.48  Analyzing the
strategic positions of each of the actors, as well as the limitations on
their ability to act separately, offers a valuable explanation of the
social-political dynamic of standard setting. Still, this theory does not
adequately explain the ongoing interaction among the various
regulatory schemes that operate simultaneously.
Indeed, while using the regulatory triangle model to analyze
global nanotechnology regulations, Abbott et al. found that the most
effective form of regulation is formal public-private collaboration.
This argument was based on their conclusion that "nearly half of the
mechanisms on the triangle are collaborative."49 However, their
analysis focuses on a limited number of nanotechnology oversight
initiatives, which do not represent the entire nanoregulatory
landscape. Furthermore, it ignores the broader informal collaboration
between public and private schemes in the entire regulatory web.
Given the range of models discussed above to promote desired
transnational governance outcomes, there is room for further
theoretical investigation in the field of nanotechnology regulation. To
find the most appropriate model, we must first gain a better
understanding of real life interactions among coexisting regulatory
arrangements. We need to know what the drivers, mechanisms, and
pathways of interactions are, who the leading actors are, at what level
they operate, where around the world decisions are made, and how
certain norms gain global supremacy over others. The concept of risk
governance, which looks at the complex web of actors, the rules they
develop, and the mechanisms they employ for collecting, analyzing,
and communicating risk information,50 is valuable for understanding
the global nanotechnology regulatory landscape.
III. DATABASE METHODOLOGY AND CLASSIFICATION
The GNRI database is a comprehensive catalogue capturing
most nanospecific regulatory initiatives51 introduced between 2000
48. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, The Governance Triangle: Regulatory
Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION 44
(Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009).
49. Kenneth W. Abbott et al., Soft Law Oversight Mechanisms for Nanotechnology, 52
JURIMETRICS J. 279, 300 (2012).
50. RENN, supra note 4, at 9.
51. Regulatory initiatives are documents that set principles, rules, or laws designed to
control or govern conduct. It does not include literature reviews of best practices or policy
statements, which do not have a normative call. Regulatory initiatives included in the GNRI
database are regulatory programs that address nanomaterial specifically, either as an
amendment, supplement, or implementation to existing regulatory programs, or as an
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and 2012. The database documents 203 GNRIs led by different
organizations, involving data collection, labeling and disclosure,
general guidelines, risk management processes, product control,
emission standards, and regulatory coordination. These initiatives
are taking place at a range of scales, from company and business
sector-specific to location-specific (cities, states, and countries; and
federal and regional) levels in different regions of the world.
The database was developed by analysis of documents and
electronic materials mostly available in English on publicly accessible
websites, conducted between October 2009 and December 2012. The
data was collected from European countries and the EU, the United
States, Canada, Australia, and to the extent possible, from Asian and
Middle Eastern countries. It was corroborated using information
reported in official Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) reports,52 the External Liaison Report to the
International Organizations for Standardization International
Organization for Standardization-Technical Committees (ISO-TC) 229
Nanotechnologies,53 and other independent reviews such as
ObservatoryNANO.54  The information was collected, filed, and
analyzed according to date, the actors involved, the geographic region
in which it originated, the aim of the initiative, the level of obligation,
the scale of the initiative, and its scope.55 The results were entered
into the database and the analysis is presented below.
It is important to note some limitations of the database. First,
there are initiatives taking place that the author could not review due
to language or access barriers. Second, the database indicates only
when the initiative was first introduced and it does not reflect
continuity over time. Third, the database does not make any
statements on the effectiveness of the initiatives in achieving their
goals.
independent one. It does not take into account existing regulatory programs that may cover
nanomaterials under their regulatory umbrella but have not been adapted for that purpose.
52. Safety of Manufactured Nanomaterials, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/env/ehs/
nanosafety/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2014).
53. On file with author.
54. ObservatoryNANO Individual Focus Reports, BAX & WILLEMS,
http://bwcv.es/observatorynano/observatorynano-individual-focus-reports (last visited Dec. 20,
2014).
55. See full classification and description of the categories in Table 1.
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Issued Date Year This field includes the year in which the
regulatory initiative was introduced for the
first time.




corporations, industry associations, civil
society organizations, and research
institutions.
Hybrid A combination of both public and private
actors.
Geographic Europe Regulatory initiatives introduced by any
Region North America organization from the region. The Global
Australia level includes either international
Asia organizations or a multi-region collaboration
Middle East between organizations.
Global
Regulatory Mandatory Affected organizations have to comply with
Obligation the rules.
Voluntary Relevant organizations can choose to comply
with the instructions.
Regulatory Data Any requirements (obligatory) or requests
Tool Collection (voluntary) by government authorities for
information on production, handling, use, risk
assessment, control measure methods, and
surveillance practices regarding nanomaterials.
Such regulatory initiatives can collect existing
data, or require or request the gathering and
submission of new data. Such data is usually
collected to serve as a basis for future
regulation or regulatory guidance.
Labeling & Any requirements, recommendations, or
Disclosure certification systems for labeling products
containing ingredients obtained through
nanotechnology. It also includes any
requirements or recommendations for third
party information disclosure regarding
nanomaterials, such as preparation of material
safety data sheets (MSDSs).
General Any documents providing general policy
Guidelines principles for risk assessment, risk




nanomaterials or for health surveillance. Such
documents may include corporate codes of
conduct, regulatory guidelines, etc. The main
distinction between these initiatives and the
ones classified as "risk management
processes" is the level of abstractness or




Any requirements or recommendations for a
holistic approach to responsible development,
handling, use, and disposal of engineered
nanomaterials, as well as approaches for
occupational health and safety measures.
Unlike the General Guidelines documents,
which only lay out the principles, these
documents provide more elaborate
descriptions and technological measures to
ensure the safety of products and a safe
working environment.
Product Any requirements or recommendations to
Control restrict, condition, or ban the distribution and
use of nano-enabled products or substances in
the market. This includes conditional
registration, quantity limitations on production
and selling, product bans, etc.
Emission Any requirements or recommendations for
Standards environmental exposure limits, including
occupational exposure limits, effluent









Any regulatory program aiming at facilitating
transnational policy coordination.
Any regulatory initiative targeting
the health and well-being of
people employed in the work environment.
All industry sectors manufacturing,
processing, handling, using, and disposing of
nano-objects that may be affected by the
regulatory initiative.
Any regulatory initiative targeting the
manufacture, processing, handling, use, and
disposal of chemical substances intended for
industrial use other than for agriculture,
pesticides, veterinary use, food, drugs, or
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cosmetics.
Food, Drugs & Any regulatory initiative targeting the
Cosmetics manufacture, processing, handling, use, and
disposal of chemical substances intended for
use as food additives, therapeutic devices, or
cosmetics.
Agriculture, Any regulatory initiative targeting the
Pesticide & manufacture, processing, handling, use, and
Veterinary use disposal of chemicals that can be used to: (a)
regulate plant growth; (b) prevent, destroy, or
mitigate any pest; or (c) prevent, cure, or
alleviate a disease or injury of an animal.
Textile, Paint Any regulatory initiative targeting the
& Electronics manufacture, processing, handling, use, and
disposal of materials used in textile, paint, and
electronic devices.
Consumer Any regulatory initiative targeting the
Products manufacture, processing, handling, use and
disposal of commonly-used merchandise
(including their components, parts, accessories
or packaging) that is ordinarily bought by
individuals or households for
private consumption (including for domestic,
recreational, and sporting purposes).
Organic Any regulatory initiative targeting the
Products manufacture of products made
from organic raw materials (including food,
textile, or cosmetics).
Table 1-Database Categories, Codes & Description of Data Collected
IV. OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS
This Part presents the findings from the analysis of the GNRI
database. The results are presented in Figures 2 to 7 and Tables 2 to
6 in the Appendix. Note that each initiative is counted only once
under the year it was first introduced and under the most appropriate
classification in each category.
Figure 2 presents the annual development of total GNRIs
between 2000 and 2012. The number of new GNRIs introduced each
year is represented by a black line, and the total number of GNRIs
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that have been introduced by the end of each year is represented by a
grey line. The cumulative numbers do not reflect whether the
regulatory initiatives have continuity over time (e.g., short period
initiatives such as "calls for information"). Initiatives that expired or
have not been fully implemented are still counted as an indication of
the extent of regulatory activity. From the cumulative figures it is
clear that a considerable effort has been made toward regulating this
field. While these data only cover the initial years of nanotechnology
regulation and the future may look distinctly different, some early
observations can be noted. First, GNRIs, in general, developed slowly
between 2000 and 2005. Faster growth in the number of GNRIs
released began in 2006 and increased significantly in 2008 (an
approximate three-fold increase between 2005 and 2006, and a ten-
fold increase between 2005 and 2008). Factors relevant to this
increase will be discussed in Part V. Between 2008 and 2012, the
number of new GNRIs released annually remained relatively steady,
at about 35 new GNRIs every year, suggesting a continual growth of
regulatory activity in subsequent years.







3 20 2 2 200 2 23
Figure 2-The annual distribution of GNRIs during 2000-2012 by
the number of GNRIs introduced in each year (black line) and the
cumulative number of total GNRIs introduced in each year (grey line).
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Moreover, as indicated in Figure 3, which shows the annual
development of new GNRIs (as shown by the black line in Figure 2)
separated by actor type, until 2008 private regulation was more
dominant, whereas public regulation seems to have emerged mainly
after that year. Prima facie, the influence of public and private
regulators appears relatively equal until 2006, with a major peak in
private activity during 2007. De facto, however, Tables 2 and 3, which
break down Figure 3 by the regulatory tools implemented and the
scope of regulation, show that private actors proactively set up risk
management and general guidelines and procedures, with general and
occupational safety and health (OSH) scopes. In contrast, public
actors lagged behind, focusing on understanding the nature and
boundaries of the nanotechnology field through data collection on the
nanotechnology industry, substance identification, nanomaterial uses,
and quantity of use before taking regulatory action.
It is therefore possible to conclude that the private sector took
the first proactive approach and was the driving force for the
development of nanotechnology regulation, while the public sector
came on board in 2008 taking more of a leadership role thereafter,
especially in the areas of industrial chemicals and food, drugs, and
cosmetics. Compared with other areas of scientific uncertainty, such
as biotechnology and climate change, this trend indicates a shift from
government-driven regulation to industry-driven regulation. For
example, Auld and Green conclude that, "[A]1though the climate
regime complex had been developing for some twenty years, private
authority does not assume a position of prominence until efforts at
intergovernmental cooperation hit their first sizeable obstacle."56 Part
V suggests some possible explanations as to why private actors set the
regulatory wheels in motion and what led to the shift that occurred in
2008. It also discusses why private regulations tend to focus on OSH
and general issues, while public regulations tend to be sector-specific
in their scope.
Another interesting observation is the insignificant number of
hybrid GNRIs (10), suggesting little formal collaboration between
public and private actors during the period in question. This is
noteworthy given the growing literature that suggests
"nanotechnology should be subject to a mixture of civil, state and
56. Auld & Green, supra note 5, at 17; see, e.g., Chris Cocklin et al., Competitiveness
Versus 'Clean and Green? The Regulation and Governance of GMOs in Australia and the UK, 39




hybrid forms of regulation."5 7 Part VI will suggest some possible
explanations for the lack of public-private partnerships. Still, as
discussed below, this finding does not exclude informal forms of
public-private collaboration and reciprocal learning.
Figure 3-The annual distribution of new GNRIs between 2000 and
2012 separated by actor type (public, private, or hybrid).
The results presented above are at a global scale; however,
some geographic regions are more active than others in the
development of GNRIs. Figure 4, which shows the geographic
regional distribution of GNRls by the various actors, shows that
during the time period examined, Europe (in terms of both public and
private action) has been most dominant in advancing new regulatory
initiatives (90); followed by North America with 68 regulatory
initiatives (mostly led by the public sector). All other regions are
considerably less active. Furthermore, Figure 5, which presents the
57. Levi-Faur & Comaneshter, supra note 44, at 160; see, e.g., Abbott et al., supra note
49, at 300; John Howard & Vladimir Murashov, National Nanotechnology Partnership to Protect
Workers, 11 J. NANOPARTICLE RES. 1673 (2009).
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level of obligation of public GNRIs for each geographic region,
indicates that most public regulatory initiatives in Europe are
voluntary (60 percent), while in North America there are
proportionately more mandatory regulatory initiatives (about 73
percent). Other regions of the world such as Australia, Asia, and the
Middle East clearly focus on voluntary mechanisms. This is also the
case globally. While this Article only briefly discusses governments'
preference to adopt voluntary mechanisms, the author has previously
elaborated on this issue elsewhere.58
Figure 4-The distribution of
total GNRls between 2000 and
2012 by geographic region
(Global, Europe, North America,
Australia, Asia and the Middle
East), separated by actor type
(public, private, or hybrid).
Figure 5-The distribution of
total public GNRIs between 2000
and 2012 by geographic region
(Global, Europe, North America,
Australia, Asia and the Middle
East), separated by the level of
regulatory obligation (mandatory
or voluntary).
58. Reut Snir, Governance by Disclosure: Transnational Convergence in the Field of
Nanotechnology, 2 TRANSNAT'L ENVTL. L. 69 (2013).
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Looking more closely, Figures 6 and 7 and Tables 4-6 highlight
the tools and scope of regulation promoted by the various actors in
each geographic region. Figure 6, which shows the distribution of
total GNRIs developed between 2000 and 2012 by the regulatory tool
adopted, indicates that overall, most GNRIs adopted risk management
processes (72); followed by data collection (56) and general initiatives
(35). Breaking the numbers down by actor type, it is clear that, while
most private GNRIs indeed adopted risk management processes
(about 61 percent), most public GNRIs adopted data collection tools
(about 42 percent) and fewer risk management processes (about 19
percent). Table 4, which breaks down Figure 6 into the geographic
regions of GNRIs, further reveals that this trend in actor preference is
shared across the globe, particularly in Europe, North America, and
Australia. In Asia and the Middle East, however, a slightly different
public regulatory approach is preferred, focusing on risk management
processes. This finding may suggest a difference in regulatory culture
and public-private relationships between Western and Eastern
countries.
According to Figure 6, product control, labeling, and disclosure
are less frequently used regulatory tools (16 GNRIs each). Overall,
private actors prefer labeling and disclosure mechanisms over product
control ones while public regulators prefer the opposite. However,
Table 4 shows that this finding varies depending on the geographic
region. For example, in Australia, Asia, and the Middle East it is the
other way around. In fact, only in North America do public actors
clearly adhere to traditional product control mechanisms under
existing chemicals regulation, and even there the tool is a preliminary
one used to drive information gathering.59 This variance in regulatory
tool preference may also suggest differences in regulatory culture and
public risk perception between geographic regions.
Next, Figure 6 indicates preliminary efforts to establish
emission standards (7 GNRIs). According to Table 4, emission
standards have so far been promoted only in Europe (by both public
and private actors) and North America (by public actors only). It is
also evident from Table 6-which describes the distribution of total
GNRIs developed between 2000 and 2012 by regulatory tool, scope,
and level of obligation-that these emission standards are focused
exclusively on the workplace environment and were published as
voluntary recommendations. Nevertheless, as elaborated in Part V,
this trend suggests the direction of future regulatory activity.
59. Id. at 81-82.
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Lastly, Figure 6 shows even less activity in promoting
transnational regulatory coordination (beginning only in 2012). This
is particularly interesting given that legal scholars on both sides of the
Atlantic have expressed concerns that urgent action is required to
avoid the regulatory divergence and international trade barriers to
nanotechnology.6 0 The author elaborates on this point in Part V.
A longitudinal analysis of these results, as presented in Table
2, reveals that globally there was no "tit-for-tat" strategic or
incremental development of regulation as suggested by some legal
scholars.61 First, private regulations that adopt general guidelines
and risk management processes (commonly referred to as
multi-stakeholder norms or self-regulation) have been developed since
2000 without any governmental guidance and before the first data
collection initiative was introduced in 2006. Second, mandatory
product-control mechanisms under chemical regulations have been in
place since as early as 2008, the same year in which the
implementation of most data-collection programs began. These trends
are observed in both Europe and North America, but less so in
Australia, where both private and public actors have been relatively
inactive.
One caveat to the last point is that some of these
product-control initiatives incorporate in their process a first stage of
massive mandatory data collection-with only marginal risk
management requirements focusing on personal exposure
control-while more substantive control actions come, if at all, only
after the data is reviewed.2  Still, these initiatives prohibit the
commercialization of the product subjected to the process until all data
is submitted and reviewed. Furthermore, the data-collection
component and the risk-management component follow one another
and, therefore, have elements of both short and long-term approaches.
Thus, these trends indicate a fluid, dynamic evolution between soft
and hard law rather than a governmental strategic approach to
regulation. They also suggest that a combination of economic and
social forces (such as public pressure and market competitiveness),
60. See, e.g., LYNN BREGGIN ET AL., SECURING THE PROMISE OF NANOTECHNOLOGIES:
TOWARDS TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION (Chatham House 2009), available at
http://eprints.1se.ac.uk/25425/1/Securingthe-promise-of technologies-towards-transatlantic re
gulatorycooperation(LSERO).pdf; Matthew Kearnes et al., From Bio to Nano: Learning Lessons
from the UK Agricultural Biotechnology Controversy, 15 SCI. AS CULTURE 291 (2006); Michael D.
Mehta, From Biotechnology to Nanotechnology: What Can We Learn from Earlier Technologies?,
24 BULL. Scl. TECH. & SOC. 34 (2004); Debra M. Strauss & Melanie C. Strauss, Globalization and
National Sovereignty: Controlling the International Food Supply in the Age of Biotechnology, 15
J. LEGAL STUD. Bus. 75 (2009).
61. See supra text accompanying note 47.
62. See discussion infra Part V.B.4.b.
132 [Vol. 17:1:107
PUBLIC-PRIVATE INTERPLAY
and not pure risk-based legal logic, drove the development of GNRIs.
Finally, they imply that risk-based approaches to regulation might not
be sufficient (or even desirable) to oversee the development of
emerging technologies under scientific uncertainty.
In terms of the scope of regulation, Figure 7, which shows the
distribution of total GNRIs developed between 2000 and 2012
according to their regulatory scope, indicates that globally, both public
and private actors are most interested in occupational-health related
issues (76). The next most common issues are industrial chemicals
(53) and general applications (39), both of which are mainly driven by
public regulators, followed by initiatives related to food, drugs, and
cosmetics (18), which are almost exclusively European and public-led.
Finally, other areas of concern are: agriculture, pesticide, and
veterinary use (5); textile, paint and electronics (4); consumer products
(3); and organic products (3), with a mix of public and private
regulation.
Nevertheless, Table 5, which breaks down Figure 7 into the
geographic regions of GNRIs, shows that while private GNRIs across
the globe are indeed focused on occupational health issues, the public
GNRI scope varies between regions. For example, in Europe, most
public activity is focused on food, drugs, and cosmetics applications; in
North America, it is focused on industrial chemicals; and at the global
level, on general applications. In addition, Table 6 indicates a
relatively significant number of mandatory GNRIs for industrial
chemicals (16) and food, drugs, and cosmetics (12)-adopting various
regulatory tools, including data-collection, product control, and
labeling and disclosure. These trends may suggest differences in
public risk perception and regulatory culture between geographic
regions, which drive regulatory activities in different sectors. They
may also relate to each region's historical experience with harmful
exposure or concerns about harmful exposure that have been
publicized in the media, leading to pressure on governments to
regulate in different areas. For example, the European experience
with the epidemic of madcow disease in the mid-80s influenced
European public opinion on GMO food, on the one hand;63 and the US
experience with recurring adverse outcomes of environmental
exposure incidents such as Love Canal, Times Beach, asbestos,
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), and others influenced US public
63. See, e.g., Lisbet Berg, Trust in Food in the Age of Mad Cow Disease: A Comparative
Study of Consumers' Evaluation of Food Safety in Belgium, Britain and Norway, 42 APPETITE 21,
21(2004).
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opinion on industrial chemicals, on the other hand.64 The lack of
private activities in areas such as food, drugs, and cosmetics, in which
public regulators have been relatively active, is also noteworthy. The
food and drug industries' inexperience with self-regulation might
explain this. However, it is a surprising finding for the cosmetics
industry given their long-lasting tradition of self-regulation combined
with the strong public demand to ban the use of nanomaterials in
cosmetics products.
Figure 6-The distribution of
total GNRIs between 2000 and
2012 by regulatory tool (Risk
Management Process, Data
Collection, General Guidelines,




actor type (public, private, or
hybrid).
Figure 7-The distribution of
total GNRIs between 2000 and





Veterinary Use, Textile, Paint
& Electronics, Consumer
Products, and Organic
Products), separated by actor
type (public, private, or hybrid).
64. See, e.g., John M. Gillroy & Robert Y.
50 PUB. OPINION Q. 270, 270 (1986).
Shapiro, The Polls: Environmental Protection,
134 [Vol. 17:1:107
PUBLIC-PRIVATE INTERPLAY
Viewed together, it is evident that the strongest trend in GNRI
development between 2000 and 2012 was the growth in initiatives
addressing risk management processes in occupational settings. It is
also evident that the leading force for such regulations was the private
sector, which was more active until 2008, the year when public sector
activity finally began. This was followed by significant public interest
in industrial chemicals and food, drug, and cosmetics applications.
These are potentially due to public pressure and previous experience
with technological problems. Furthermore, the difference in
regulatory approaches adopted by each actor is noticeable. While the
private sector has been focused on developing practical risk
management mechanisms and general guidelines from the very start,
the public sector appears to have been more hesitant, initially focusing
on data collection. Still, growing public activity in the area of
industrial chemicals and food, drugs, and cosmetics, as well as in
setting emission standards for the workplace, indicates the direction
that more substantive formal regulation will take.
V. DISCUSSION OF THE GLOBAL REGULATORY TRENDS
This Part turns to a more detailed discussion of the trends in
the development of nanotechnology regulation before and after the
turning point in 2008, highlighting several regulatory initiatives and
the role they played in shaping the global landscape of nanotechnology
regulatory norms. Attention is given to both the regions and type of
actors from which these initiatives originate, highlighting trends in
policy diffusion around the world and between types of actors. This
Part also suggests some explanations for: (1) the emergence of private
regulation in an unregulated domain and the shift that occurred in
2008; (2) the dynamics between public and private regulations; (3) the
overall lack of formal public-private partnerships; and (4) the
differences in EHS risk regulation approaches across the globe.
A. Trends Until 2008: The Private Regulation "Big Bang"
1. Deliberation First: Third Party Codes of Conduct for Responsible
Development
Think-tanks and other third-party private organizations first
raised the issue of responsible development of nanotechnology and
developed codes of conduct (CoCs) to direct companies in assessing
2014] 135
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
and managing the risks of nanomaterials.65 These were developed
through a multi-stakeholder deliberative process and are
characterized by a holistic approach that examines the entire life cycle
of product manufacture, handling, use, and disposal. These initiatives
sent the first signal to both industry and regulators that, in order to
realize the potential of nanotechnology, applications should be
developed in a socially and environmentally responsible manner.
Their main goal was to inspire the development of self-regulation in a
responsible way according to certain principles and procedures.
For example, in 2000, the Foresight Institute, a US-based
think-tank focused on transformative future technologies, introduced
their draft Guidelines for Responsible Nanotechnology Development.66
These guidelines were based on analysis and discussions starting in
the late 1970s, when K. Eric Drexler first brought to public attention
the profound impact that these future technologies could have on the
human condition.67 The guidelines include assumptions, principles,
and some specific recommendations intended to provide a basis for the
responsible development of nanotechnology. The goal was for the
guidelines to be adopted by organizations sponsoring nanotechnology
research and development projects, and to inspire effective
self-regulation.68 Over the years, the guidelines were modified and
revised and their latest version (the sixth) was released in 2006.69
According to some commentators, while not having a direct impact on
nanotechnology regulation, the guidelines have been effective in
raising awareness and fostering debate on nanotechnology regulation,
particularly with respect to ethical concerns related to self-replicating
autonomous nanodevices.70 Other examples exist to support the
NGOs' influence on driving nanotechnology regulation, in which a key
element was transparency about the nanomaterial content in the
product.71
65. See, e.g., NANOACTION PROJECT, INT'L CTR. FOR TECH. ASSESSMENT, PRINCIPLES FOR
THE OVERSIGHT OF NANOTECHNOLOGIES AND NANOMATERIALS (2007), available
at http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/files/final-pdf-principles-for-oversight-of-nanotechnologies
80684.pdf; Neil Jacobstein, Foresight Inst., Foresight Guidelines for Responsible
Nanotechnology Development (draft version 6) (Apr. 2006), available at
http://www.foresight.org/guidelines/ForesightGuidelinesV6.pdf.




70. Abbott et al., supra note 49, at 287.
71. See, e.g., NANOACTION PROJECT, supra note 65, at 3.
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2. The Response to Public Demand for Disclosure: Product
Information Communication
As the prospect of commercialization of nanotechnology became
more realistic, the importance of ethics in the development grew.
Consequently, both proponents and opponents of nanotechnology have
called for more transparency and information disclosure on the
products. In response, since 2004, governments in several Asian
countries and third-party organizations in Europe began developing
voluntary certification schemes that ensure the quality or safety of the
product. While some of the disclosure and labeling schemes indeed
attempt to provide a certain level of assurance on the safety of the
product, many have instead aimed to address the risk of fraud and
abuse in selling and marketing products. This indicates that these
governments are generally in favor of nanotechnology and are thus
implementing market controls to ensure product effectiveness rather
than to control EHS risks.
a. Product Quality Certification and Labeling
In 2004, the Taiwan Industrial Development Bureau (IDB) and
Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) entrusted the Industrial
Technology Research Institute (ITRI) Center for Measurement
Standards (CMS) with executing the "Nano-product Certification
System Plan"-nanoMark.n2 The goal of nanoMark is to build "nano
brand" credibility through the confirmation of the new functions
generated due to the nanoscale. In this manner it intends to highlight
quality products and promote competition in the market. According to
the center's website, obtaining the nanoMark certification can help
companies enhance their corporate image, gain customer trust, and
promote market sales-including increasing the selling price of their
products by 20 percent.73 From 2004 to August 2013, the Taiwan
nanoMark Certification System certified 1,257 products from
thirty-seven companies. This certification approach was followed by
several similar schemes introduced in other countries around the
world such as the Hohenstein Quality Label (2005) and Quality Seal
Nano-Inside (2008) in Germany, the Nano Mark Certificate in Iran
(2009),74 and the NanoQ in Thailand (2011).
72. Introduction, NANOMARK, http://www.nanomark.org.tw/Eng/About/ (last visited Dec.
20, 2014).
73. Id.
74. From a global market perspective, it is interesting to note that unlike its
counterparts, the Iranian Nano Mark Certificate is mandatory for government-funded
applications. This requirement is somewhat puzzling given that it is related to positive labeling,
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These schemes, however, focus on the accuracy of the
manufacturer's claims on the product label with respect to the
incorporation of nanoparticles in the product, and only to a lesser
extent, if at all, on the life-cycle implications of the products.
Therefore, they should be best viewed as efforts to promote local and
global commercialization of nanobased products. In subsequent years,
these initiatives may find themselves competing with other product
labeling schemes on the accepted global approach to labeling of
nano-enabled products.
b. Product Risk Management Certification
A different approach has been applied in Europe, where in
2006, the German TUV SUD and the Swiss Innovation Society have
introduced CENARIOS@, a full certifiable risk management and
monitoring system specifically adapted to nanotechnologies.75
CENARIOS@ provides a "structured methodology for the industry and
commercial enterprises to identify, analyze, and assess potential risks
and opportunities in products and processes."76  It combines the
elements of traditional risk assessment and analysis with
future-oriented risk monitoring and communication tools specifically
adapted to the characteristics of new technologies. The first company
granted CENARIOS@ certification was Buhler Partec in 2007.77
More recently, TUV SUD and the Innovation Society have also
started offering additional services such as a NanoRisk Check, which
gives companies an overview of their risk position regarding the
handling and use of nanomaterials in products.8  It is unclear
whether this initiative has taken off at all and whether its
semi-quantitative risk assessment module has been adopted by others.
Still, it implies that, even with the lack of current scientific data
regarding the actual risks of nanomaterials, it is possible to prioritize
levels of risks and respond to them accordingly. Therefore, it serves as
a pioneering example for a precautionary regulatory approach to deal
which is in the economic interest of the developer and allegedly does not require a government
regulatory intervention. Tsung-Tsan Su, Presentation at the Plenary of ISO/TC 229 14th
Meeting, ISO/TC 229 ANF Liaison Report, at slide 5 (June 11-15, 2012) (on file with author).
75. Fact sheet, CENARIOS@ Certifiable Nanospecific Risk Management and Monitoring
System, INNOVATION Soc. & TUIV SOD (2006), http://innovationsgesellschaft.ch/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/FactsheetCENARIOS-english.pdf.
76. Id. at 3.
77. Bilhler AG, Biihler Partec's Risk Management System Certified, NANOWERK NEWS
(Sept. 11, 2007), http://www.nanowerk.com/news/newsid=2544.php.
78. NanoRisk Check-The Risk Screening, TUV SUD, http://www.tuev-




with scientific uncertainty by employing proxy variables that refer to
the nature of the hazardous characteristics of nanomaterials.
3. Industry Going Green: Self-Implementation of Risk Management
Programs
During the early years, large organizations also took up the
gauntlet and started developing in-house approaches to responsible
development of nanotechnologies. These approaches include
best-practices guidelines for working safely with nano-objects as well
as CoCs and product stewardship programs covering the following:
protection of employees, customers and business partners; protection
of the environment; participation in safety research; and open
communication and dialogue. By doing so, the industry sent a strong
signal to both the public and regulators that the nanotechnology
industry is up for the challenge and wants to get the technology right.
This is a twenty-first century industry that has learned the lessons of
historical failures.
Over the years, such self-regulatory initiatives account for at
least 25 percent of the total number of GNRIs. 79 Note that not all
companies dealing with nanomaterials publish their internal activities
for promoting safe working environments on their websites. It is thus
likely that some initiatives at the company level have not been
included in the database and their actual number may be even higher.
a. Life-Cycle Risk Management Framework
The first organization to develop an in-house holistic risk
management approach tailored specifically to the development of
nanomaterials was Luna Innovations Inc., a US-based business
focused on developing and manufacturing new-generation products for
the healthcare, telecommunications, energy, and defense markets.8 0
In 2003, Luna introduced its NanoSAFE program, a best-practices
approach to minimizing EHS risk in nanotechnology manufacturing
based on a five-point strategy that includes: facility management,
product stewardship, workforce protection, environmental
management, and emerging technologies and strategies.8 1 It was the
first effort by a private company to strategically assess and manage
79. See supra Part IV.
80. About Luna, LUNA, http://lunainc.com/about-luna/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2014).
81. Matthew Hull, Nanotechnology Risk Management and Small Business: A Case
Study on the NanoSafe Framework, in NANOTECHNOLOGY ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND SAFETY:
RISKS, REGULATION AND MANAGEMENT 248 (Matthew Hull & Diana Bowman eds., 2010).
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the environmental, health, and safety implications of its
nanotechnology-related activities along the life cycle of the product.
Some explanation of the early actions by the private sector can
be found in EHS Today's interview with the developer of the
NanoSAFE program in 2005:
The proactive aspect of NanoSAFE is as much about good business sense as it is about
environmental and human health and safety. Hull explained that NanoSAFE is driven
by the business need to prepare for the federal safety and environmental
nanotechnology standards that are sure to come sooner or later. For those companies
that aren't ready when federal regulators get a handle on nanotechnology, the cost of
compliance could be steep.8 2
Thus, it is clear that at least some firms see self-regulation
that goes beyond compliance as a risk mitigation strategy that makes
good business sense. As discussed earlier, such EHS stewardship
programs may prepare firms for "rainy days"-not only in case of
future government regulations but also in case of future liability for
harm to public health and the environment. Reducing risk amid
regulatory uncertainty allows companies to lower their economic and
political liabilities by showing that they did their best to prevent
harms.3
In the same year, another well-known risk management
process scheme-the NanoRisk Framework-was introduced by
DuPont, a large US-based chemical company, and Environmental
Defense Fund (EDF), a US-based environmental NGO. 84 In 2005, the
heads of both organizations jointly stated in the Wall Street Journal:
"An early and open examination of the potential risks of a new product
or technology is not just good common sense-it's good business
strategy."85 Following this statement, the collaboration between the
two organizations yielded a risk assessment and management guide
that provides a procedure for the development of data profiles of
nanomaterials properties, inherent hazards, and exposure potential.86
The procedure is based on six steps: describe material and expected
application; profile life cycles; evaluate life cycle risks; assess risk
management; decide, document, and act; and review and adapt.87
82. Josh Cable, A Best Practices Approach to Minimizing EHS Risk in Nanotechnology
Manufacturing, EHS TODAY (Oct. 6, 2005), http://ehstoday.com/news/ehs-imp_37825.
83. See supra Part II.B.
84. Project Archive, DuPont-Safer Nanotech, EDF + BUSINESS,
http://www.nanoriskframework.com (last visited Dec. 20, 2014).
85. Fred Krupp & Chad Holliday, Let's Get Nanotech Right, WALL ST. J., June 14, 2005,
http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/5177_OpEdWSJO50614.pdf.




Here again, going beyond compliance is this top firm's business
strategy: adopting such a risk management program provides DuPont
with a better competitive position based on its environmental quality
operations, their open relationship with communities and others, and
the environmental attributes of their products. As discussed above,
such a business strategy goes beyond risk mitigation to gain market
share and creates a positive public image, which will enhance the
company's long-term business success.8 8 This move, with all the
substantive resource investment it implies, makes a lot of business
sense given the amount of public criticism DuPont has faced for
endangering the health of both its employees and the public in
previous years.89
Subsequently, the NanoRisk Framework served as the starting
point for an ISO technical report on Nanotechnologies-Nanomaterial
Risk Evaluation, published in 2011.90 While it has undergone some
changes during the ISO negotiations, the basic logic behind the
NanoRisk Framework is retained in the ISO document. In turn, the
ISO document was adopted (or is in the process of being adopted) as a
national standard by various countries.9 ' This development shines a
light on additional potential drivers for the nanotechnology industry
to go beyond compliance. It demonstrates the power of a "first mover"
to influence global regulatory norms that are later adopted by national
governments. In this way, DuPont may ultimately raise the cost of
entry for its rivals.
b. Occupational Safety and Health Best Practices
Approaches to overseeing OSH issues have proliferated in the
past few years. Between 2000 and 2007, OSH GNRIs accounted for
about 52 percent of total GNRIs developed, of which about 71 percent
were private-led. Given that the workplace has historically been
where the highest levels of exposure to chemical agents occur, focusing
initial efforts on OSH appears to be adaptive to past experience.
Examples of such regulatory initiatives are numerous and include
Texas A&M Engineering (2005), BASF (2006), and Bayer (2007),
88. See supra Part II.B.
89. Corporate Profile of DuPont (E.L DuPont de Nemours and Company), CORPORATE
WATCH (Nov. 2002), http://www.corporatewatch.org/?1id=170.
90. ISO, Nanotechnologies-Nanomaterial Risk Evaluation, ISO/TR 13121:2011 (May
12, 2011).
91. See, e.g., BUREAU OF INDIAN STANDARDS, DRAFT INDIAN STANDARD:
NANOTECHNOLOGIES-NANOMATERIAL RISK EVALUATION MTD 33 (5110) (2011) (noting that the
draft Indian Standard is "identical with ISO/TR 13121:2011 'Nanotechnologies-Nanomaterial
risk evaluation' issued by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO)").
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which played a leading role in developing best practices at the
organizational level.
The self-regulatory mechanisms introduced by businesses and
other private organizations did not necessarily invent new ways of
managing workplace risks; rather, the new mechanisms relied
primarily on EHS programs already implemented by the organization,
adapting the procedures to address the new materials. When
developing new materials, there is always a level of uncertainty
regarding potential EHS risks, and programs include mechanisms to
address this knowledge gap. The same process is also applied to
nanomaterials, although the margin of safety and the precautionary
measures that are applied for each material may change based on
professional judgment regarding the likelihood of the risk. Such
professional judgment may later become the subject of negotiation
when developing national and international risk management
approaches that are often reliant on industry best practices.
While some firms and academic institutions were moving
forward, not waiting for the advice of government agencies, there was
a growing demand by the broader nanotechnology community for an
authoritative guideline on approaches to safe nanotechnology. To
address this call, the US National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health (NIOSH) published a non-policy information exchange on
approaches to safe nanotechnology in 2005.92 This document was out
in draft form for four years, during which it was revised several times,
and in 2009 the agency's official recommendations were published.93
NIOSH was followed by other agencies such as the US Department of
Energy, which set guidance for its in-house research labs.
4. Public-Private Partnership: The Way to Go?
In light of the spontaneous and informal collaborations that
have started to intertwine public and private actors in setting
regulatory initiatives to address market needs, the question that
comes to mind is whether partnerships and coregulations are the best
way to go. The early days of collaborations between private companies
or industry associations and government agencies have yielded some
92. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., U.S. Nat'1 Inst. for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH) & Ctrs. for Disease Control (CDC), Approaches to Safe Nanotechnology: An
Information Exchange with NIOSH, (Oct. 1, 2005), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/nanotech/pdfs/ApproachestoSafeNanotechnology.pdf.
93. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS, U.S. NAT'L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
AND HEALTH (NIOSH) & CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, APPROACHES TO SAFE
NANOTECHNOLOGY: MANAGING THE HEALTH AND SAFETY CONCERNS ASSOCIATED WITH
ENGINEERED NANOMATERIALS (2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2009-125.
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important lessons, which highlight the benefits and limitations of
hybrid initiatives. For example, in 2005, the Nanoparticle
Occupational Safety and Health (NOSH) Consortium was formed by a
group of sixteen members-including multi-national corporations
(such as DuPont, Dow Chemical, Intel, and Boeing), government
agencies from the US (NIOSH) and the UK (HSE), and NGOs (such as
EDF)-to "answer specific questions which would benefit a broad
global audience in terms of helping to define what would be best
practice to protect workers with respect to handling engineered
nanoparticles."9 4  The consortium's objectives were to develop a
portable aerosol monitor and a test method to measure filtration
efficiency for commercially available filter media.95 In addition to
meeting its objectives, the consortium is regarded as a successful
approach to transatlantic public-private collaboration:
[Tihe NOSH Consortium has been viewed by a wide audience to be an excellent
demonstration of the technical and professional progress that can be achieved as part of
a successful collaboration between diverse and interested professionals. The fact that the
NOSH Consortium was able to identify common goals, navigate through complex
technical results, and find common ground to present findings to the technical
community is a testament to the value of people working together to achieve exciting
results.
9 6
This statement raises questions about what made this
collaboration successful and why the GNRI landscape is not abundant
with such initiatives. While the motivation to enroll and to invest
substantial resources in such collaboration sounds simple-common
goals-it hides a "tacit understanding" of the interests that drive both
public and private actors. Methods to monitor exposure and
determine filtration efficiency are essential for the development of
technology-based emission standards. Such standards are often
developed based on industrial best practices.97 In emerging fields, the
industry may not have experience in all aspects necessary for
regulation; thus, these best practices are not fully developed.
Public regulators need the industry's money and expertise in
order to develop best practices. This explains the motivation for
public regulators' involvement in such a project. Large businesses, on
the other hand, have a strategic business interest in being a "first
94. Nanoparticle Occupational Safety and Health (NOSH) Consortium, Executive
Summary, at 1 (Dec. 13, 2007), available at http://www.hse.gov.uk/nanotechnology/
consortiumsummary.pdf.
95. Id.
96. Michele L. Ostraat, Industry-Led Initiative for Occupational Health and Safety, in
NANOTECHNOLOGY ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND SAFETY: RISKS, REGULATIONS AND
MANAGEMENT 234 (Matthew Hull & Diana Bowman eds., 2010) (emphasis added).
97. Timothy F. Malloy, Soft Law and Nanotechnology: A Functional Perspective, 52
JURIMETRICS 347, 352 (2012).
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mover." Regulation that adopts technically-based emission standards
using a business's in-house technology saves the business money in
new control-technologies implementation and puts it in a better
position compared to its competitors. This explains the motivation for
private firms' voluntary investment of substantial resources in such a
project.
Thus, although the interests of the partners might be different,
understanding and agreeing to pursue other partners' interests makes
the partnership successful. It is the economic, social, and political
forces, not "the value of people working together," that attract
interested stakeholders to come together and yield a technical
consensus in a contested field. Today, the ambivalent nature of
technical matters and the value-laden nature of the consensus process
of technical matters are widely understood.98 Statements on the
success of the technical consensus process should therefore be read
with more scrutiny, as there is often a tacit understanding
underlining public-private collaboration and the consensus may
benefit some more than others.99 Thus, while broad stakeholder
collaboration may be ideal from a governance normative point of view,
it does not always make business or political sense-the "free rider
dilemma"-and it is definitely not a commonplace practice.
This conclusion can be supported by reviewing another
collaborative effort in this area. In 2006, the German Federal
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (BAuA) and the German
Chemical Industry Association (VCI) jointly collected data on methods
currently applied in chemical industry OSH for the handling and use
of nanomaterials.100  This survey resulted in the joint publication of
98. The neutrality of technical matters has been challenged by many academic studies
that deconstruct the process in which "scientific facts" have been produced and consolidated,
showing how the result was influenced by social and political judgment. This was also
acknowledged by those involved directly with producing them. See, e.g., SHEILA S. JASANOFF,
THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS 229 (1990) (noting that they are
"aware that what they are doing is not 'science' in any ordinary sense, but a hybrid activity that
combines elements of scientific evidence and reasoning with large doses of social and political
judgment").
99. Another example is the OECD's Working Party of Manufactured Nanomaterials
(WPMN) Sponsorship Programme for the Testing of Manufactured Nanomaterials (SPTMN),
which funds the safety testing of a priority list of thirteen manufactured nanomaterials which
are already in use or will be soon, for an agreed list of endpoints. The outcomes of this
Sponsorship Programme will provide information on the "intrinsic properties" that determine the
appropriate risk evaluation and management strategies. See Sponsorship Programme for the
Testing of Manufactured Nanomaterials, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/science/nanosafety/
sponsorshipprogrammeforthetestingofmanufacturednanomaterials.htm (last visited Dec. 20,
2014).
100. Exposure to Nanomaterials in Germany: Results of the Corporate Survey of the
Federal Institute for Occupational Health and Safety (BAuA) and the Association of the Chemical
Industry (VCI) Using Questionnaires, BAUA: BUNDESANSTALT FUR ARBEITSSCHUTZ UND
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the Guidance for Handling and Use of Nanomaterials at the
Workplace, which contains recommendations and operating
instructions for handling nanomaterials.101 After a second survey, it
was updated in 2012 by the new Recommendations for the Risk
Assessment for Activities Involving Nanomaterials in the Workplace.102
In this series of initiatives, however, the public-private
collaboration was between a regulatory agency and a business
association, not individual private businesses. Thus, the regulated
businesses were not directly involved in developing the
recommendations and have less influence over the negotiation process.
This may result in less motivation for businesses to participate in the
data collection program. Indeed, of the 656 businesses approached to
answer the survey, the return rate was 33 percent, of which 79
percent claimed not to have performed any activities involving
nanomaterials.103 Thus, despite the hybrid nature of the regulatory
initiative, the involvement of a business representative in the design
and implementation of the program, and the relatively non-
burdensome data request (businesses were not asked to generate new
information), the participation rate was low. There was no strategic
business incentive for firms to participate, partially because the
survey was anonymous and firms undertaking efforts regarding
nanotechnologies would not even be recognized for such activities.
Beginning in 2007, the outcomes of national and international
standard-setting bodies' work in the field of nanotechnology became
more evident. Nanotechnology-specific technical committees have
been established within many standardization bodies around the globe
since 2005, but they only started releasing documents in 2007. In the
area of ESH, the first to publish a guidance document was the
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) International
with its Standard Guide for Handling Unbound Engineered
Nanoparticles in Occupational Settings.104 It was followed by the
British Standards Institution (BSI), which published
ARBEITSMEDIZIN (Apr. 24, 2008), http://www.baua.de/en/Topics-from-A-to-Z/Hazardous-
Substances/Nanotechnology/pdf/surveypdf [hereinafter Exposure to Nanomaterials in Germany].
101. Guidance for Handling and Use of Nanomaterials at the Workplace,
BAUA: BUNDESANSTALT FOR ARBEITSSCHUTZ UND ARBEITSMEDIZIN (Aug. 12,
2007), http://www.baua.de/en/Topics-from-A-to-Z/Hazardous-Substances/Nanotechnology/pdfl
guidance.pdf ?blob=publicationFile&v=2.
102. Nanotechnology, BAUA: BUNDESANSTALT FOR ARBEITSSCHUTZ UND ARBEITSMEDIZIN,
http://www.baua.de/en/Topics-from-A-to-Z/Hazardous-Substances/Nanotechnology/
Nanotechnology.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2014) (providing link to updated 2012 report in
German).
103. See Exposure to Nanomaterials in Germany, supra note 100.
104. ASTM Int'l, Standard Guide For Handling Unbound Engineered Nanoscale
Particles in Occupational Settings, E2535-07 (2007) (reapproved 2013).
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Nanotechnologies-Part 2: Guide to Safe Handling and Disposal of
Manufactured Nano materials.105 A year later, in 2008, the ISO
published its technical report, Nanotechnologies-Health and Safety
Practices in Occupational Settings Relevant to Nanotechnologies.106
While regulatory initiatives issued by standardization bodies
are mostly classified as private regulatory initiatives in the GNRI
database (unless the legal structure of the specific national body is
public or hybrid), there are hybrid attributes to the consensus process
that are worth noting in this context. All of these regulatory
initiatives have an open, voluntary, and consensus based process
through which they have been developed; and the negotiations were
done by designated experts from multiple stakeholders representing
public, private, civil society, or academic organizations, under the
orchestration of the standard-setting body's secretariat. The
negotiation process follows strict procedural rules set by the
standard-setting body, which aim to facilitate an open dialogue with a
consensual outcome. Over the years, such organizations have become
very influential players in transnational governance, awarding them
the title of "The New Global Rulers."107  Prima facie, such a
rule-making framework represents an ideal model for public and
private collaboration; de facto, however, many scholars have criticized
these organizations for being captured by Western countries' industry
interests and for not allowing a "real" equal opportunity to participate
in the standard-setting process. Their effectiveness at promoting
societal goals has therefore been challenged.108 Nevertheless, they
have promoted progressive precautionary risk management
approaches to deal with the current lack of scientific knowledge, each
in its own way.109  Therefore, public-private partnerships are
successful if both parties have a tangible incentive to participate. If
105. British Standards Inst. [BSI], Nanotechnologies-Part 2: Guide to Safe Handling
and Disposal of Manufactured Nanomaterials, PD 6699-2:2007 (Dec. 2007).
106. ISO, Nanotechnologies-Health and Safety Practices in Occupational Settings
Relevant o Nanotechnologies, ISO/TR 12885:2008 (2008).
107. See BUTHE & MATTLI, supra note 32; see also, BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note
37.
108. See, e.g., Jennifer Clapp, The Privatization of Global Environmental Governance:
ISO 14000 and the Developing World, 4 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 295 (1998); Robert W. Hamilton,
The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the Development of Mandatory Federal Standards
Affecting Safety or Health, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1329 (1977); Spencer J. Henson, The Role of Public
and Private Standards in Regulating International Food Markets, 4 J. INT'L AGRIC. TRADE &
DEV. 63 (2007).
109. See, e.g., ISO, Nanotechnologies-Nanomaterial Risk Evaluation, supra note 90,
§ 7.3.5. ("[I]n situations where there is risk uncertainty, a precautionary approach (i.e. assuming
higher levels of risk) should be utilized.").
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they do not, any such partnership is likely to be ineffective, or worse,
not representative of all interests.
5. Closing Data-Asymmetry: Data Collection Programs
During the first phase of regulation, public regulators kept
relatively quiet. Initially, governments' focus was on acquiring
information for their various needs, including obtaining an overview of
the nanotech industry or workplace condition, obtaining available
data for risk assessment and risk management purposes, guiding
research programs, and supporting the development of new policy.
Most programs required information only regarding existing basic
information on the company, substance identification, use, and
quantity of use. Some initiatives also requested more specific
information such as substance characterization, physical-chemical
properties, effects, fate and behavior, measurement and detection
techniques, and risk management practices.110 Nevertheless, such
programs sent a signal to both industry and the public that the
government is in the picture and is likely to act upon any finding of
actual risk for human health or the environment. These programs
received a significant boost in 2008 and continued to grow
thereafter.'
B. Trends after 2008: Public Regulation Enters High Gear
In 2008 and thereafter, private organizations maintained their
rate of introduction of workplace safety measures, CoCs and life-cycle
risk management processes of nanomaterials. On the other hand,
there was a dramatic increase in activities in the public sector.
Although most of the public regulatory initiatives after 2008 still focus
on data collection, there are some efforts in other directions such as
risk management processes, regulatory guidance, product labeling,
product control and codes of conduct.112
This awakening could have been the result of various factors
acting together and independently. First, it is likely that some
bottlenecks opened up after 2008 when public initiatives that had
110. Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Analysis of Information Gathering
Initiatives on Manufactured Nanornaterials, ENV/JM/MONO(2009)45 (Nov. 24, 2009).
111. See infra Part V.B.1.
112. The author discusses this light-touch government approach-"governance-by-
disclosure"-elsewhere, explaining why governments worldwide have been slow in promoting
regulations in the field of nanotechnology and why they tend to focus on information disclosure
mechanisms. The author further explains why data collection approaches have been similar
around the world and that when implementing other regulatory tools, a greater diversity can be
expected and indeed observed. See Snir, supra note 58.
2014] 147
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
been in the pipeline for a long time finally came into effect. This may
also explain the private sector's early expectation for future regulation
and its desire to make the first move. Second, as public awareness of
nanotechnology and its potential implications grew over the years, so
too did public demands for governments to oversee nanotechnology
development. Third, in the early years, nanotechnology was still at
the research and development stage and the ability to mass produce
nano-objects was (and still is) the greatest challenge in fulfilling the
promises of the new technologies; therefore nanotechnology has gone
under the radar of the regulatory threshold. Over the years, however,
new production methods have resulted in the production of various
nano-objects in larger quantities, making them a gradually more
pressing regulatory issue.' In addition, in 2008, the first Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA) Section 8(e) adverse effects report for
nanomaterials and "For Your Information" (FYI) Submissions were
submitted. Notices were submitted by several corporations, including
BASF and Bayer, for their Carbon Nanotube (CNT) materials,
indicating a more concrete risk from some nano-objects.114
1. Boosting Data Collection Programs: From Voluntary to Mandatory
Schemes
After 2008, governments started pursuing more
systematic-and in some cases mandatory-data-collection
mechanisms. Overall, these initiatives account for about 42 percent of
total public and hybrid GNRIs. As presented in Table 4, out of 57
data-collection regulatory initiatives, 30 originate in North America,
19 in Europe, 5 in Australia, 2 at the Global level, and 1 in Asia. In
addition, 6 initiatives classified as "product control" focus primarily on
additional testing requirements as a pre-condition for manufacturing
and importing permits, and 9 initiatives classified as "general
guidelines" provide companies with guidance on how to develop the
necessary data for compliance with data-collection requirements. In
113. For illustration, while graphene was discovered in 2004, researchers have been
searching for an easy method to produce it in large quantities for many years, and not until mid-
2010 was a breakthrough technique developed that works at room temperature and needs little
processing, paving the way for cost-effective mass production of graphene. See New Method for
Producing Graphene Paves Way for Mass Production of Nanomaterial, SCIENCE DAILY (June 22,
2010), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/06/100621122132.htm.
114. See, e.g., Letter from Janet Cerra, BASF Corp. to U.S. EPA, Notice in Accordance
with Section 8(e): Results of Subchronic Inhalation Study in Wistar Rats with Carbon Nano Tube
(July 8, 2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/oppt/tsca8e/pubs/8ehq/2008/aug08/
8ehq-080817208a.pdf; Letter from Richard A. Jourdenais, Director, chemicals division Bayer
MaterialScience LLP to U.S. EPA, Multiwalled Carbon Nanotube Toxicity Information (July 9,
2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/oppt/tsca8e/pubs/8ehq/2008/jul08/fyi_0708-0161la.pdf.
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terms of levels of obligation, most initiatives in North America are
mandatory, whereas in Europe and Australia the majority of
initiatives are voluntary. Yet, in Europe and Australia, most
initiatives are sectorial (e.g., industrial chemicals, food and feed,
consumer products, and occupational health) while in North America,
most initiatives focus on specific targeted substances or lists of
substances, indicating risk hot-spots rather than systematic data
collection on nanomaterials.
During 2013, several European notification schemes came into
force. For example, Article 13 of the new EU cosmetics regulation
requires cosmetics manufacturers to notify the European Commission
(EC) of any nanoparticles contained in products before the start of
marketing activities within the EU and to submit the information
specified in the regulation.115 In January 2012, the EC established the
Cosmetics Product Notification Portal (CPNP), a central system into
which distributors will have to submit information, including the
presence of nanomaterials, on cosmetics placed on the market. Direct
access to the database will be limited to authorities only.116
As another example, the French mandatory annual declaration
of nanoparticles scheme (R-Nano.fr) requires French manufacturers,
importers, and distributors of substances intentionally manufactured
in nano size, and in volumes of more than 100 grams per year, to
submit an annual declaration to the French Ministry of Ecology,
Sustainable Development and Energy (MEDDE).1 17  Information
required in the declaration includes: (1) personal information of the
registrant; (2) chemical identity; (3) chemo-physical properties of the
substance (such as composition, distribution, size, aggregation,
agglomeration, shape, crystalline state, specific surface area, surface
charge, surface chemistry, and coating); and (4) manufacturing,
115. Regulation 1223/2009, art. 16, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30
November 2009 on Cosmetic Products (recast), 2009 O.J. (L342) 59, 70 (EC).
116. Cosmetics Product Notification Portal (CPNP), EUROPEAN COMM'N (2012),
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/sectors/cosmetics/files/pdf/cpnp-new-en.pdf.
117. Article 185 on Prevention of Risks to Health and the Environment from Exposure
to Substances in the State of Nanoparticle, made under Law No 2010-788 of July 12, 2010 on
National Commitment to the Environment, amending Title II of the French Environmental
Code, OJRF 0160/12 905 (2010); D~cret 2012-232 du 17 fivrier 2012 relatif A la d6claration
annuelle des substances A l'6tat nanoparticulaire pris en application de l'article L. 523-4 du code
de 1'environnement [Decree 2012-232 of February 17, 2012 On the Annual Declaration on
Substances at Nanoscale in Application of Article R. 523-4 of the Environment Code], JOURNAL
OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE, [J.O.][OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC],
Feb. 19, 2012, p. 2863; Ministerial Order of 6 August 2012 on the Content and the Conditions for
the Presentation of the Annual Declaration on Substances at Nanoscale, in application of
Articles R. 523-12 and R. 523-13 of the Environment Code, OJRF 18/112 (2012); Declaration of
Nanomaterials, R-NANO.FR, https://www.r-nano.fr/?locale=en (last visited Dec. 20, 2014).
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distribution and uses information."5  As of June 30, 2013, 670
companies have made 3,400 declarations representing 500 thousand
tons of substances placed on the market in France in 2012. This
amount is estimated to reflect only a partial picture of the market;"9
therefore the effectiveness of this approach is still questionable.12 0
Nevertheless, to date, no indication has been given as to how
governments have used or intend to use the collected data in the
development of regulation, and even the most comprehensive
mandatory reporting system under the EU chemical and labeling
regulations12 1 has yielded very little risk data on nanomaterials.122
According to interim results of the European Chemicals Agency's
(ECHA) search of Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and
Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) and Classification, Labelling and
Packaging of Substances and Mixtures (CLP) submissions for
nanomaterials at the end of June 2011-out of 26,600 REACH
registrations, 4,700 distinctive substances, and 3.2 million CLP
notifications, only 3 REACH dossiers for 3 substances, and 15 CLP
notifications for 14 substances have been explicitly submitted for
nanomaterials. Six additional dossiers, not classified in the
International Uniform Chemical Information Database 5.2 (IUCLID)
as "nanomaterials," included nanoscale substances.123 This picture
has not changed dramatically in the review carried out at the end of
February 2012.124
118. SAFENANO, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE FRENCH DECLARATION OF
NANOPARTICULATE SUBSTANCES (2013) (English translation).
119. FRANCE MINISTRY OF ECOLOGY, SUSTAINABLE DEV. & ENERGY (MEDDE), RESULTS
OF THE FIRST YEAR OF REPORTING.
120. See Snir, supra note 58, at 85-91 for discussion on the limitations of nano-
information reporting schemes.
121. Council Regulation 1907, 2006 O.J. (L 396) (EC); Council Regulation 1272, 2008
O.J. (L 353) (EC).
122. See Snir, supra note 58, at 86-87 for additional discussion on level of participation
in data collection programs.
123. See Topical Briefing: Interim Results: ECHA's Search of REACH- and CLP-
Submissions for Nanomaterials, NIA NANOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES AsS'N (May 10, 2011),
available at http://www.nanotechia.org/nia-internal-news/nia-exclusive---topical-briefing-interim-
results-echa-s-search-of-reach--and-clp-submissions-for-nanomaterials; Snir, supra note 58, at 82
n. 60.
124. Commission Staff Working Paper on Types and Uses of Nanomaterials, Including




2. Extending Responsible Development Codes of Conduct: From
NGOs to Business Organizations and Government Agencies
From 2008 onwards, an increasing number of CoCs have been
developed by third-party private organizations, business associations,
and government agencies. Most CoCs specify general principles for
responsible Research and Development of nanotechnology, allowing
for greater flexibility in actual performance when implemented. An
example of a business association's CoC is the Swiss retailers'
association's (IG DHS) CoC,12 5 which was implemented by some of its
members: Charles V6gele, Coop, Manor, Migros, and Valora.126
Similarly, the German government published the NanoKommission, a
framework of five basic principles for responsible use of
nanomaterials, which are expected to be further developed into
sector-specific guidelines that provide guidance on practical
implementation.127 Several companies, such as Evonik and sectoral
industry associations such as VCI and the German Paint Industry
Association, have referred to the NanoKommission principles in their
guidelines; however its implementation in general falls short of
expectations, and efforts are being made in Germany to increase the
level of awareness and implementation of the CoC. 128
A more ambitious approach was taken in the UK through
collaboration between the Royal Society, Insight Investment, the
Nanotechnology Industries Association, and the Nanotechnology
Knowledge Transfer Network in developing the Responsible
Nanocode.129 This initiative specifies seven principles, accompanied
by examples of good practice, which organizations need to address
with respect to the economic and societal effects of their activities in
nanotechnology. These principles cover: (1) board accountability;
(2) stakeholder involvement; (3) worker health and safety;
(4) environment, health and safety risks; (5) social, environmental,
125. IG DHS INTERESSENGEMEINSCHAFr DETAILHANDEL SCHWEIZ, CODE OF CONDUCT:
NANOTECHNOLOGIES (Feb. 5, 2008), available at http://nanotech.1aw.asu.edu/Documents/2011/06/
CoCNanotechnologies-english544_3536.pdf.
126. Id.
127. RESPONSIBLE USE OF NANOTECHNOLOGIES: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
GERMAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S NANOKOMMISSION 2008 (Wolf-Michael Catenhusen & Antje
Grobe eds., 2009), available at http://www.bmu.de/fileadmin/bmu-import/files/english/pdfl
application/pdf/nanokommabschlussbericht2008_en.pdf.
128. ANTJE GROBE, RESPONSIBLE USE OF NANOTECHNOLOGIES: REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S NANOKOMMISSION 2011, 28 (Wolf-
Michael Catenhusen ed., 2010), available at http://www.bmu.de/fileadmin/bmu-
import/files/english/pdf/application/pdf/nanoschlussbericht 201 1bfen.pdf.
129. INSIGHT INV. ET AL., INFORMATION ON THE RESPONSIBLE NANO CODE INISITATIVE
(May 2008), available at http://www.nanoandme.org/downloads/The%20Responsible%20Nano%
20Code.pdf.
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health, and ethical implications; (6) engaging with partners; and
(7) transparency and disclosure.130  To date, the Responsible
NanoCode has not been fully implemented due to limited resources
and the lack of a central organization that can oversee its
implementation. However, its principles are shared by other private
and public CoCs.
At the EU level, the voluntary CoC for responsible research
calls on governments to encourage all entities under their jurisdiction
that conduct nanotechnology research to follow the principles and
guidelines set forth in the Code.131 Thus far, the only European
country to set a general contractual obligation to comply with the EU
CoC in grant agreements is the Netherlands.132 Interestingly, outside
of Europe, the South Korean Ministry of Knowledge and Economy
published Guidance on Safe Management of Nanotechnology Based
Products that follows the principles of the EU CoC.133 To improve the
level of awareness and implementation of the Code, in 2010 the EC
launched the NanoCode project, which resulted in the development of
a Master Plan for revision and implementation of the Code, as well as
the CodeMeter, a tool to help firms determine whether they are
complying with its principles.134
Overall, similar to the CoCs in the early years, the post-2008
CoCs had relatively minor influence because of, inter alia, the
proliferation of competing CoCs in this field. As some commentators
note, an organization facing competing CoCs that require different
courses of action tends to harmonize them rather than choose one over
the other, thereby adhering to the lowest common denominator.35 It
is also likely that the incentive for firms to implement these
codes-building reputational capital-is not strong enough given their
130. Id.
131- Commission Recommendation on a Code of Conduct for Responsible Nanosciences
and Nanotechnologies Research, COM (2008) 424 final (Feb. 7, 2008), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/nanotechnology/pdf/nanocode-recpe0894c-en.pdf.
132. DAVID BENNETT & SERENE CHI, DELFT UNIV. OF TECH., SURVEY RESULTS: COUNTRY
REPORT "THE NETHERLANDS" (2010).
133. OECD, Current Developments/Activities on the Safety of Manufactured
Nanomaterials, at 39 ENV/JMIMONO(2009) 45 (May 23, 2011), available at
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/displaydocumentpdf/?cote=env/jm/mono(2011)12&doclang
uage=en.
134. CHRISTOPH MEILI ET AL., NANOCODE PROJECT, NANOCODE MASTERPLAN: ISSUES AND
OPTIONS ON THE PATH FORWARD WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION CODE OF CONDUCT ON
RESPONSIBLE N&N RESEARCH (2011), available at http://www.nanotec.it/public/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/NanoCodeMasterPlan.pdf; CHRISTOPH MEILI ET AL., NANOCODE
PROJECT, REPORT ON THE NANOCODE CODEMETER TOOL: CONCEPTS, OBJECTIVES & APPLICATION
(2011), available at http://www.nanotec.it/public/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NanoCode-
CodeMeterToolReport.pdf.
135. Malloy, supra note 97, at 354.
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limited resources and constant struggle to survive in an emerging and
competitive market. Therefore, it is unclear whether current efforts to
raise awareness of the codes will have any impact. Both the lack of
implementation and the merely cosmetic efforts to change that
indicate some limitations for the principle-based, self-regulation
approach when it is introduced by the government without concrete
rewards for participating in the program.
3. Scaling Up Risk Management Programs: From Bottom-Up to
Top-Down
a. Life-Cycle Risk Management Frameworks
The limitations of the principles-based CoCs led to the
development of more specific, process-based approaches to life-cycle
risk management in 2008 and thereafter. Some initiatives address
each stage of the life cycle of the product separately, while others
apply one holistic process. Some have been published in the form of
guidance documents, while others developed more sophisticated
computer-based tools. However, these initiatives, unlike earlier
efforts, are no longer bottom-up, company-specific approaches; rather,
they are institutionalized, top-down approaches advanced by business
associations, government agencies, and insurance companies.
For example, VCI has issued a series of documents that provide
guidance on all aspects of good product stewardship on nanomaterials:
from implementing Responsible Care@ for nanomaterials to
regulatory documents on complying with REACH, globally
harmonized system (GHS), to material data safety sheet (MSDS)
requirements for nanomaterials.136 In the public sector, a similar
attempt was made by the Japanese Ministry of the Environment,
which published Guidelines for Preventing the Environmental Impact
of Manufactured Nano materials.1 3 7  This document provides
information that allows manufacturers to choose a proper control
policy for environmental conservation throughout the life cycle of the
manufactured nanomaterial.138
A more sophisticated approach was introduced by Zurich
Financial Services Ltd., a Swiss-based insurance company, and
136. GERMAN CHEM. INDUS. ASS'N [VCI], RESPONSIBLE PRODUCTION AND USE OF
NANOMATERIALS (2008).
137. JAPAN MINISTRY OF ENV'T, GUIDELINES FOR PREVENTING THE ENVIRONMENTAL
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Intertox, Inc., a US-based toxicological research firm, in 2009. This
trans-Atlantic joint venture has developed the Zurich Nanotechnology
Exposure ProtocoIrM (ZNEPTM), a web-based computer software
product capable of quantitatively assessing potential risks of
nano-objects and nanomaterials using a standard risk assessment
approach for Zurich customers. The science-based program relies on
nano-object characteristics such as size, shape, solubility, and other
properties, as well as reliable scientific studies reported in the
literature, to assist in determining the level of potential hazard of
nanomaterials. ZNEPTM is designed to add updated scientific content
as new studies are reported. Customer procedures, product uses, and
disposal issues are then factored into the equation to produce an
in-depth risk analysis of the potential toxicity of the nanoparticles
used in the product.139
Besides serving as an innovative approach for risk assessment
and risk management, this example indicates the arrival of a new
regulatory force into the nanotechnology field-insurance companies.
As observed in recent years in other environmental fields, the shadow
of liability law moves insurers to require the implementation of
rigorous internal control systems as a condition for underwriting
pollution liability insurance. Accordingly, insurers require sound
environmental practices before a policy is issued.140  Third-party
regulators, such as insurance companies, may be in a position to
exercise more coercive power over a regulated entity than a state
regulatory agency,14 1 and their entrance into the nanotechnology field
sends a clear signal to the industry that good-will is not enough and
adequate performance is expected.
b. Occupational Safety and Health Best Practices
From 2008 onwards, the number of new OSH regulatory
initiatives, which include OSH best practices guidance, precautionary
risk mitigation tools, workers' health surveillance practices, and
exposure limits, has grown constantly. Unlike the OSH GNRIs
introduced before 2008, which were mostly voluntary, private, and
organization-specific, the OSH GNRIs introduced after 2008 are
139. Zurich Fin. Servs., Insight on Nanotechnology, INDUSTRY INSIGHT 2-3 (Jonathan Tin
ed., June 2009), available at http://www.zurich.com/NR/rdonlyres/19B26BAF-B2AB-4CAA-B8D6-
7A20A2A77B1A/0/Insight Nanowebfinal3.pdf.
140. Id.; see, e.g., STEPHAN SCHMIDHEINY & FEDERICO ZORRAQUiN, FINANCING CHANGE:
THE FINANCIAL COMMUNITY, ECOEFFICIENCY, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 117-30, (1996);
Andrew J. Hoffman, Linking Organizational and Field-Level Analyses: The Diffusion of
Corporate Environmental Practice, 14 ORG. & ENV'T 133 (2001).
141. Grabosky, supra note 46, at 197.
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carried out at a much broader scale by both public and private actors,
some on a mandatory basis. This shift indicates the future direction of
OSH GNRIs, but more importantly, it reveals some underlying
dynamics in transnational public-private interplay.
i. OSH Best Practices Guidance
OSH guidance has been published with varying levels of detail
by various actors. For example, in the private sector, the Producers
Association of Carbon NanoTubes in Europe (PACTE)142 and the
French Union of Chemical Industries1 43 have published information on
risk mitigation best practices. In the public sector, UK Health and
Safety Executive (HSE), Environment Canada, and Work Safe
Australia (WSA) have published similar voluntary informative
guidance.144 There are also several collaborations between public and
private sectors, such as the UK NanoSafety Partnership Group.145 As
nanosafety is an emerging field, these documents are being updated
constantly as new knowledge arises.
Nevertheless, all these guidance initiatives have been
introduced on a voluntary basis, and there are only a few mandatory
occupational risk management standards. Mandatory initiatives
include, for example, the Japanese Ministry of Health, Labor and
Welfare's (MHLW) Notification on Present Preventive Measures for the
Prevention of Exposure at Workplaces Manufacturing and Handling
142. Producers Ass'n of Carbon nanoTubes in Europe (PACTE), Code of Conduct for the
Production and Use of Carbon Nanotubes (2008), http://www.nanocyl.com/en/content/download/
219/1544/file/PACTE%20Code%20of/o20conduct.pdf.
143. FtDtRATION FRANCAISE POUR LES SCIENCES DE LA CHIMIE (FFC) & UNION DES
INDUSTRIES CHIMIQUES (UIC), CELLULE INNOVATION: GOOD PRACTICE GUIDE NANOMATERIALS
AND HSE (2009).
144. See ENV'T CANADA, Scl. & TECH. BRANCH, GUIDE FOR THE SAFE HANDLING OF
NANOTECHNOLOGY-BASED PRODUCTS (2009), available at http://publications.gc.ca/collections/
collection_2010/ec/En84-79-2010-eng.pdf; GREG HAYWOOD, SAFE WORK AUSTRALIA, SAFE
HANDLING AND USE OF CARBON NANOTUBES (2012), available at
http://www.safeworkaustralia.gov.au/AboutSafeWorkAustralialWhatWeDolPublications/Docume
nts/664/Safe%2OHandling%20and%2Use%200f%2OCarbon%20Nanotubes.pdf; HEALTH &
SAFETY EXEC. (HSE), RISK MANAGEMENT OF CARBON NANOTUBES (2009), available at
http://www.steptoe.com/assets/htmldocuments/UK%20HSE%2Risk%20Mgmt%2OCarbon%20Na
notubes.pdf; HEALTH & SAFETY EXEC. (HSE), USING NANOMATERIALS AT WORK: INCLUDING
CARBON NANOTUBES (CNTS) AND OTHER BIOPERSISTENT HIGH ASPECT RATIO NANOMATERIALS
(HARNS) (2013), available at http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/books/hsg272.pdf; Work Health and
Safety Assessment Tool for Handling Engineered Nanomaterials, SAFE WORK AUSTRALIA,
http://www.safeworkaustralia.gov.au/AboutSafeWorkAustralia/WhatWeDo/Publications[Docume
nts/547/Work-health-safety-tool-handling-engineerednanomaterials.pdf (last visited Dec. 20,
2014).
145. UK NANOSAFETY P'SHIP GRP. (UKNSPG), WORKING SAFELY WITH NANOMATERIALS
IN RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT (2012), available at http://www.fan.org.ar/es/wp-
content/uploads/nanosustentablefWorkingSafelywithNanomaterials-Releasel0-Aug2012.pdf.
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Nano materials.14 6 The notification, first issued in 2008 and updated
in 2009,147 instructs how "nanomaterial-related work" should be
carried out, including using technical exposure control and personal
protective equipment, measurement of nanomaterial concentration in
the working environment, and procedures for waste disposal and
cleaning. It also provides specific procedures for emergency response,
health surveillance, and worker training.
Another example of mandatory requirements is the US
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Pre-Manufacturing Notice
(PMN) Consent Order and Significant New Use Rules (SNURs) under
the TSCA of 1976, which applies to various nanomaterials on a
case-by-case basis since 2008. Under these authorities, the EPA
requires companies to follow specific personal exposure control
measures approved by NIOSH.148
More interesting, however, is the way in which these seemingly
independent regulatory initiatives, both public and private, have
interacted with and helped shape one another over the years. For
example, the aforementioned US NIOSH draft document, Approaches
to Safe Nanotechnology, served to kick off the international work and
to help achieve transnational consensus on the equivalent ISO
technical report, Health and Safety Practices in Occupational Settings
Relevant to Nanotechnologies. Once the ISO document was finalized
in 2008, sections of it were incorporated in the final 2009 version of
the NIOSH recommendations. In addition, the ISO report was
adopted as a national standard by various countries (e.g., Canada,
India, Indonesia, South Korea, and soon China), facilitating a broader,
complementary ,rather than conflicting, transnational governance.
This evolution and diffusion of global OSH best practices reveals
146. JAPAN MINISTRY OF HEALTH, LABOUR & WELFARE (MHLW), RE: NOTIFICATION ON
PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES FOR PREVENTION OF EXPOSURE ETC. TO NANOMATERIALS (LSB
Notification No.0331013) (2009), available at http://www.jniosh.go.jp/joholnanolfiles/mhlw/
Notification_0331013_en.pdf.
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., Significant New Use Rules on Certain Chemical Substances, 77 Fed. Reg.
61124 (Oct. 5, 2012) (discussing potassium titanium oxide); Significant New Use Rules on
Certain Chemical Substances, 77 Fed. Reg. 20296, 20299-300 (Apr. 4, 2012) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 9, 721) (discussing carbon nanostructures, generic); Multi-Walled Carbon Nanotubes;
Significant New Use Rule, 76. Fed. Reg. 26186-92 (May 6, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts.
9, 721; Multi-Walled Carbon Nanotubes and Single-Walled Carbon Nanotubes; Significant New
Use Rules, 75. Fed. Reg. 56880, 56880-89 (Sept. 17, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 721);
Significant New Use Rules on Certain Chemical Substances, 73 Fed. Reg. 65743, 65751-52 (Nov.
5, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 721) (discussing silica and alumina particles); U.S. EPA,
OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION & TOXICS, Regulation of a New Chemical Substance Pending
Development of Information; Consent Order and Determinations Supporting Consent Order, P-08-




dynamics of constant dialogue and mutual learning between public
and private regulatory arrangements at multiple levels, which
eventually leads to regulatory innovation. It also shows transnational
private organizations and their consensus-based standards building a
framework that provides government agencies the confidence to issue
guidance for new technology. By doing so, these private organizations
enhance international collaborations and transnational governance
integration faster and more effectively than traditional
inter-governmental organizations such as the World Health
Organization (WHO). 149
ii. Precautionary Risk Mitigation Tools
In addition to the best practice guidance, several methods were
developed to assist the assessment and management of potential
exposure to nanoparticles, and the nanospecific health and
environmental risk of nanoproducts under conditions of scientific
uncertainty. These methods are based on the precautionary principle
and recommend extra control measures when there is insufficient data
to determine the level of risk. For example, in 2008 the Swiss Federal
Office for Public Health and the Swiss Federal Office for the
Environment published the first version of the Precautionary Matrix
for Synthetic Nanomaterials.s0 The matrix is a screening tool to
estimate the nanospecific potential risk of nanomaterials and their
applications for workers, customers, and the environment based on
selected evaluation parameters. It also helps in identifying possible
sources of risk in the development, production, use, and disposal of
synthetic nanomaterials. Risk potential is classified and matched
with appropriate measures to protect health and the environment.151
The matrix is a voluntary tool introduced as part of the first phase in
the Swiss Action Plan Synthetic Nanomaterials to create a regulatory
framework for responsible handling of synthetic nanomaterials.152
Furthermore, since 2009 several GNRIs were developed to
apply a Control Banding Approach 53 to workers' exposure to
149. The WHO started developing its guidelines only in 2012 and it is a work in progress.
See WHO Guidelines on Nanomaterials and Worker's Health, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/occupational-health/topics/nanotechnologies/en/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2014).
150.
151. Id. at 7.
152. Id. at 5.
153. Control Banding is a complementary approach to protecting worker health by
focusing resources on exposure controls. Since it is not possible to assign a specific Occupational
Exposure Limit to every chemical in use, a chemical is assigned to a "band" for control measures,
based on its hazard classification according to international criteria, the amount of chemical in
use, and its volatility or dustiness. BENJAMIN 0. ALLI, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF
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nanoparticles. For example, Workplace Health and Safety
Queensland (WHSQ) has developed a Nanomaterial Control Banding
Tool Worksheet to assist with risk management of nanomaterials,
particularly at research facilities where small quantities of
nanomaterials are likely to be used. This tool can also be applied at
all nanotechnology workplaces.154 Similarly, the Dutch Ministry of
Social Affairs and Employment developed the Stoffenmanager Nano
module, an online tool to qualitatively assess occupational health risks
from inhalation exposure to manufactured nano-objects (MNOs).155 It
is designed as a tool for small and medium enterprises to prioritize
potential health risks occurring as a result of exposure to MNOs at the
workplace and to find effective measures to manage these risks. Risk
management measures may be included in the facility's workplace
risk assessment, evaluation, and action plan. The Module is a work in
process that reflects the current knowledge on risks related to working
with nanomaterials, and it puts the precautionary principle into
practice and is a good example of an innovative way to deal with
current scientific uncertainty.156 As of 2013, Stoffenmanager Nano is
available in three languages-English, Finish, and German-and it
has more than six hundred users.157  More recently, the
Stoffenmanager approach has been implemented in the ISO Technical
Specification, Nanotechnologies-Occupational Risk Management
Applied to Engineered Nano materials-Part 2: Use of the Control
Banding Approach.158
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY 119-20 (2d ed. 2008), available at
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/
wcms_093550.pdf.
154. See Nanomaterial Control Banding Tool Worksheet, WORKPLACE HEALTH & SAFETY




155. STOFFENMANAGER NANO MODULE 1.0, http://nano.stoffenmanager.nl/ (last visited
Dec. 20, 2014).
156. DUUJREN-STUURMAN ET AL., STOFFENMANAGER NANO: DESCRIPTION OF THE
CONCEPTUAL CONTROL BANDING MODEL, TNO REPORT V9216, 4 (2011), available at
https://nano.stoffenmanager.nl/public/factsheets/STMNano_%20Bevindingendocument.pdf.
157. Email from Dr. Henri Heussen, Senior Consultant, Arbo Unie, to Reut Snir, Ph.D.
Candidat, Bar Ilan University (Sept. 12, 2013, 15:37 IDT) (on file with author).
158. ISO, Nanotechnologies-Occupational Risk Management Applied to Engineered




iii. Worker Health Surveillance and Exposure Limits
In terms of worker health surveillance, US NIOSH published
guidance concerning specific medical tests recommended for
asymptomatic workers exposed to engineered nanomaterials until
additional research either supports or negates the need for this type of
screening.159  In addition, several organizations have started
developing numerical occupational exposure limits (OELs) for
nanosubstances. For example, US NIOSH recommends a reference
exposure limit (REL) for TiO2, 160 and for carbon nanotubes and carbon
nanofibers.161 Similarly, other OSH research institutes in Germany62
and in the Netherlands163 have introduced RELs, benchmark exposure
limits (BELs), or derived no-effect levels for specific manufactured
nanomaterials. Although none of these have been adopted by
regulatory agencies to date, the growing interest in this area suggests
that more regulation is soon to follow.
During this time, several private companies (such as BASF,
Nanocyl, and Bayer) have also established OELs as part of the
implementation of a product stewardship program to ensure the safe
use of their products. These OELs appear on the safety data sheet of
the relevant products. More recently, ISO has approved a New Work
Item Proposal (NWIP), General Framework for the Development of
Occupational Exposure Limits for Nano-Objects and their
Agglomerates and Aggregates (NOAA), which intends to describe a
general framework for the development of OELs for individual NOAAs
159. See DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL (CDC) & U.S.
NAT'L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH (NIOSH), INTERIM GUIDANCE FOR MEDICAL
SCREENING AND HAZARD SURVEILLANCE FOR WORKERS POTENTIALLY EXPOSED TO ENGINEERED
NANOPARTICLES (2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2009-116/pdfs/2009-116.pdf.
160. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL (CDC) & U.S.
NAT'L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH (NIOSH), OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE TO
TITANIUM DIOXIDE (2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2011-160/pdfs/2011-
160.pdf.
161. Id.; DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS,, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL (CDC) & U.S.
NAT'L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH (NIOSH), OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE TO
CARBON NANOTUBES AND NANOFIBERS (2013), available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2013-
145/pdfs/2013-145.pdf.
162. Inst. for Occupational Safety & Health of the German Soc. Accident Ins., Criteria
for Assessment of the Effectiveness of Protective Measures: Limit Values in Germany, IFA,
http://www.dguv.de/ifa/Fachinfos/Nanopartikel-am-Arbeitsplatz/Beurteilung-von-Schutzma%/`C3
%9Fnahmen/index-2.jsp (last visited Dec. 20, 2014).
163. DUTCH Soc. & ECON. COUNCIL (SER), PROVISIONAL NANO REFERENCE VALUES FOR
ENGINEERED NANOMATERIALS (2012), http://www.ser.nl/-/media/Files/Internet/Talen/Engels/
2012/201201/2012O1.ashx.
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and categories of NOAAs for different levels of available data.164 Time
will tell which of the national approaches have "won" in the
international negotiation process.
To keep pace with the development of new workplace practices,
a collaboration of several organizations introduced a beta version of
the GoodNanoGuide in 2010. This is an Internet-based collaboration
platform specially designed to enhance the ability of experts to
exchange ideas on how best to handle nanomaterials in an
occupational setting. It creates an interactive forum that fills the
need for up-to-date information about current good workplace
practices, highlighting new practices as they develop.165  The
GoodNanoGuide provides both OSH Protocols and a Reference
Manual. The OSH Reference Manual outlines the various approaches
taken by professionals to develop appropriate protocols and guidelines.
The Manual is organized into six sections intended to conform with
general industrial processes and is open for editing.
4. Governments Push Harder: Product-Specific Regulation
As discussed above, after 2008, governments started exploring
product-specific oversight approaches. In North America, the focus of
regulation is on traditional product case-by-case control mechanisms
under existing chemicals regulations; other countries around the globe
have developed new sectorial regulatory initiatives to address
nanomaterial in products, mainly by facilitating product information.
In addition, the scope of regulatory initiatives has seemed to
vary-industrial chemicals in North America, and food, drugs, and
cosmetics in Europe. These differences in regulatory approaches may
indicate differences in public risk perception and regulatory culture.
They may also relate to the region's historical experience with harmful
exposure, leading to pressure on governments to regulate in different
areas as discussed above.
a. Product Information Communication
After 2008, much development has been made in the area of
product information communication. While more product quality
schemes have been introduced in Asia and Iran-Europe, Australia
and New Zealand have moved fast in the direction of product safety
schemes, including nanospecific safety data sheets and new
164. ISO, GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE
LIMITS FOR NANO-OBJECTS AND THEIR AGGLOMERATES AND AGGREGATES (2013) (on file with
author).
165. GOODNANOGUIDE, http://goodnanoguide.org/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2014).
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mandatory labeling requirements. Still, many technical and scientific
uncertainties present challenges to the effective implementation of
these schemes.
i. Safety Data Sheet
Guidance on nanospecific information for a Safety Data Sheet
(SDS) was published over the years by various institutions such as the
German VCI,166 the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs
(SECO),167 Safe Work Australia (SWA), 168 Queensland's state
authorities,169 and ISO.170
These initiatives provide some guidance on the necessary data
on physical and chemical properties unique to nanomaterials171
cautionary statements for use on an SDS when data is insufficient, as
well as specific recommendations for control measures, particularly
engineering controls and personal protective equipment for nanosized
particulates. While the Australian Code of Practice recommends that
labels be prepared for all products containing nanomaterials in the
workplace unless there is evidence that the nanomaterials are not
hazardous, no government is currently requiring the preparation of an
SDS for nanomaterials. Consequently, very few nanobased products
actually have an SDS that specifically addresses their nano-enhanced
properties.
ii. Product Labeling
In 2009, Europe moved further toward product labeling. The
EU's new cosmetic products regulation,17 2 food information to
166. VCI, GUIDANCE FOR THE PASSING ON OF INFORMATION ALONG THE SUPPLY CHAIN IN
THE HANDLING OF NANOMATERIALS VIA SAFETY DATA SHEETS (2008).
167. Swiss STATE SECRETARIAT FOR ECON. AFFAIRS (SECO), SAFETY DATA SHEET (SDS):
GUIDELINES FOR SYNTHETIC NANOMATERIALS (version 2.0) (2012), available at
http://www.bag.admin.ch/nanotechnologie/12171/12176/index.html?lang-en.
168. SAFE WORK AUSTRALIA, PREPARATION OF SAFETY DATA SHEETS FOR HAZARDOUS
CHEMICALS: CODE OF PRACTICE (2011), available at http://www.safeworkaustralia.gov.au/
sites/SWAlabout/Publications/Documents/642/COPPreparation ofLSafety-Data-Sheet-for
HazardousChemicals.pdf.
169. WORKPLACE HEALTH & SAFETY QUEENSLAND (WHSQ), LABELING OF WORKPLACE
HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS (2011).
170. ISO, Nanotechnologies, ISO/TC 229 (2005).
171. Including size distribution, shape and aspect ratio, crystallinity, dustiness, surface
area, degree of aggregation or agglomeration, ionization (redox potential), biodurability or
biopersistence, and surface coating.
172. Regulation 1223/2009, art. 16, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30
November 2009 on Cosmetic Products (recast), 2009 O.J. (L342) 59, 70 (EC).
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consumers regulation,173 and biocidal products regulation1 74 require
cosmetics manufacturers, food business operators responsible for
providing food information to consumers, and those authorized to
place nanobiocidal products on the market to label all products
marketed within the EU containing nanoparticles with the word
"nano" in brackets. Following Europe's lead, New Zealand amended
its Cosmetic Products Group Standard 2006 to include additional
labeling, aligning it with the EU Cosmetics Regulation, Article 19
(Labeling) and Article 6 (Obligations of Distributors).
Still, as the author discussed previously,17 5 the effectiveness of
these regulations is in doubt due to scientific and technical limitations
related to the measurement of nanomaterials. To show regulatory
compliance, manufacturers have to distinguish between
nanomaterials and non-nanomaterials by implementing the EC
recommendation on the definition of nanomaterials.176 However, it is
not always clear whether a material fulfills the criteria of the
definition. A recent report by the EC's Joint Research Centre (JRC)
concluded that: "[N]one of the currently available methods can
determine whether all kinds of potential nanomaterials meet the
regulatory definition or not." 77
b. Product Control
In the last few years, more governments have taken their first
steps towards product and market control. These mechanisms impose
great burdens and expenses on companies wishing to sell certain
nanomaterials. However, as mentioned above, the EU and North
America have taken different approaches to this type of regulation.
While the EU attempts to cover a broader range of nanomaterials
under its regulatory screening, countries in North America choose to
focus on "hot-spot" areas where they believe there is a higher
likelihood for risk.178 At this time, it is too early to judge which
approach is more effective at protecting the public and changing
industry behavior towards more socially responsible development.
173. Regulation 1169/2011 on Food Information to Consumers, 2011 O.J. (L304/18) (EU).
174. Regulation 528/2012, Concerning the Making Available on the Market and Use of
Biocidal Products, 2012 O.J. (L167/1) (EU).
175. Snir, supra note 58, at 84-85.
176. Commission Recommendation of 18 October 2011 on the Definition of Nanomaterial,
2011/696/EU OJ (L 275/38).
177. THOMAS LINSINGER ET AL., EUROPEAN COMM'N JOINT RESEARCH CTR. (JRC),
REQUIREMENTS ON MEASUREMENTS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
DEFINITION OF THE TERM 'NANOMATERIAL' 9 (2012), available at
http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC73260.
178. See supra Part V.B.1.
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In the EU, for example, the EU regulation on Plastic Materials
and Articles Intended for Coming into Contact with Food demands
that nanomaterials should be used for this purpose only after being
authorized on a case-by-case basis.179  Similarly, the Biocidal
Regulation sets the conditions for an authorization of biocidal products
containing nanomaterials, which include: the approval of an active
nanoscale substance should be explicitly mentioned (Article 4(4));
where nanomaterials are used in a biocidal product, the risk to the
environment and to health should be assessed separately (Article
19(1)(f)); and biocidal products containing nanomaterials are not
eligible for "simplified authorization procedure" (Article 25).18o
Additionally, at the national level, several countries issued
notifications in the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RAFF)
restricting the commerce of some novel food products enhanced by
nanotechnology.181 A somewhat similar product control effort was
undertaken by the Canadian government in 2010 to ban the use of
nanomaterials in organic products under the Organic Product
Regulation.182  Organic food standards forbidding the use of
nanomaterials exist in other countries as well (such as the UK and
Australia), but these were initiated by private organizations and are
not incorporated into the national legislation.
In North America, the US EPA has been the most active
regulatory agency regarding nanomaterials, and it has mainly focused
on a case-by-case application of its authorities under Section 5(e)
Pre-manufacture Notice (PMN) Consent Order, and Section 5(a)(2)
SNURs of TSCA. 183 Since 2008, US EPA has reviewed over 150 PMNs
179. Regulation 10/2011 on Plastic Materials and Articles Intended to Come into
Contact with Food, art. 9, 2011 O.J. (L12/1) (EU).
180. Regulation 528/2012, Concerning the Making Available on the Market and Use of
Biocidal Products, 2012 O.J. (L167/1) (EU).
181. For example, in 2008, Finland issued a notification of unauthorized novel food (use
of nanotechnology for increased metabolic usability stated on the label) regarding a food
supplement imported from the United States; in 2009, Slovenia issued a notification of an
unauthorized novel food ingredient obtained through nanotechnology (creatine monohydrate) in
food intended for athletes, which came to Europe from the United States, via Poland; and in
2010, Austria issued a notification of an unauthorized novel food ingredient (clinoptilolite)
obtained through nanotechnology in a food supplement from Germany. See Rapid Alert System
for Food and Feed (RASFF) Portal, EUROPEAN COMM'N, https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/rasff-
window/portallindex.cfm?event=searchResultList.
182. Gov't of Canada, Canadian Gen. Standards Bd., Organic Production Systems
General Principles and Management Standards, CAN/CGSB-32.310-2006, amended June 2011.
183. Another area in which the US EPA has been somewhat active in using its authority
to grant companies conditional registrations under Section 3(c)(7)(C) of the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). However, in the case of HeiQ Materials' AGS-20 product
(nanosilver powder) the EPA had to face a Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) petition
to court because of lack of substantive evidence that the product will not cause unreasonable
adverse effects on human health. The court concluded that under EPA's own criteria the product
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for nanomaterials and entered into TSCA PMN consent orders with
several companies (including Thomas Swan & Co. Ltd., CNano
Technology Ltd., Arkema Inc., Pyrograf Products Ltd., and SouthWest
NanoTechnologies, Inc.) regarding the manufacture of their CNT
products. The consent order includes requirements for submission of
product samples and MSDS, specific inhalation tests, and material
characterization information. As mentioned above, it also requires the
company to follow specific personal exposure control measures. The
company is prohibited from manufacturing, importing, processing,
distributing in commerce, using, or disposing of these products in the
US for any nonexempt commercial purpose, pending the development
of information and the completion of the EPA's review of, and
regulatory action based on, that information.184
In addition, US EPA issued SNURs for several nanosubstances
such as silica and alumina,185 multi/single wall carbon nanotubes
(M/SWCNT), 186 infused CNT generics,187 and potassium titanium
oxide.188 These SNURs aim to provide the EPA with a basic set of
information on the nanosubstances, to help evaluate the intended uses
of the nanoscale materials, and to take action to prohibit or limit
activities that may present an unreasonable risk to human health or
the environment. The SNURs require:
[A]ny person who began commercial manufacture, import, or processing of [the
nanosubstance subject to the SNUR] . . . after the date of publication of the proposed
SNUR must stop that activity before the effective date of this final rule. Persons who
ceased those activities will have to meet all SNUR notice requirements and wait until
the end of the notification review period, including all extensions, before engaging in
any activities designated as significant new uses.18 9
posed an unacceptably high health risk to toddlers and to that extent granted the petition. See
Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 735 F.3d 873, 886-87 (9th Cir. 2013).
184. U.S. EPA, OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION & Toxics, Regulation of a New
Chemical Substance Pending Development of Information; Consent Order and Determinations
Supporting Consent Order, P-08-0177, available at http://www.nanolawreport.com/EPA%20
Premanufacture%20Notice%20Number%20P-08-0177.pdf.
185. Significant New Use Rules on Certain Chemical Substances, 73 Fed. Reg. 65743,
65751-52 (Nov. 5, 2008).
186. Multi-Walled Carbon Nanotubes and Single-Walled Carbon Nanotubes; Significant
New Use Rules, 75. Fed. Reg. 56880, 56880-89 (Sept. 17, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9,
721); Multi-Walled Carbon Nanotubes; Significant New Use Rule, 76. Fed. Reg. 26186-92 (May 6,
2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 721).
187. Significant New Use Rules on Certain Chemical Substances, 77 Fed. Reg. 20296,
20299-300 (Apr. 4, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 721).
188. Significant New Use Rules on Certain Chemical Substances, 77 Fed. Reg. 61124
(Oct. 5, 2012).
189. Multi-Walled Carbon Nanotubes; Significant New Use Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 26,186
(May 6, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 721).
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So far, the EPA issued SNURs mainly to require additional
testing as a pre-condition for manufacturing and importing permits
rather than to impose specific market controls. Indeed, as
mentioned above, it also requires the company to follow specific
personal exposure control measures and, in some cases, adds a
''no-release-to-water restriction," but these requirements are relatively
marginal.190
In response to the EPA testing requirements, the NanoSafety
Consortium for Carbon (NCC), a US-based association of carbon
nanomaterial producers, was established primarily to submit a
proposed testing consent agreement to the EPA. To reduce testing
costs while still providing the EPA with sufficient data to make
informed decisions, NCC proposed a testing program for a
representative set of carbon nanomaterials. Testing would be
conducted based on protocols developed by independent scientists.191
If approved by the EPA, member companies would be granted
comprehensive permission to commercialize their CNT products based
on the collective testing they conducted on selected materials.192 By
establishing such a voluntary program, the involved businesses are
granted recognition and greater credibility for their activities, which
may lead to more flexible regulatory compliance requirements that
save the business time and resources. In this case, the public
regulation drove the private innovative approach that resulted in an
informal tacit collaboration.
5. The Transnational Debate: Regulatory Coordination
Despite the lessons learned from the commercialization of
GMOs, the urgency to take actions to avoid similar regulatory
divergence, and international trade barriers to nanobased
applications, there has been little coordination of national regulations
transnationally. The first and only regulatory initiative to be
190. In this context, it is worth noting Environment Canada's activities under Section 85
of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA). Since 2007 Environment Canada issued
more than twenty Significant New Activity (SNAc) Notices requiring pre-manufacturing
information regarding the nominated nanosubstances. See, e.g., Significant New Activity Notice
no. 15007, 141 C. Gaz. 52, 2007 (Can.). While the Canadian CEPA SNAcs are very similar in
nature to US EPA TSCA SNURs, in all notices related to nanomaterials they only required
information submission with no additional exposure control requirements. The author therefore
classified them in the GNRI database as mandatory data collection initiatives.
191. Letter from John C. Monica, NCC's counsel to James Alwood, U.S. EPA
Chemical Control Division (Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.nanolawreport.com/
AlwoodLetterandProposal201104O6.pdf (regarding NanoSafety consortium for carbon and
proposed testing agreement).
192. J. C. Monica, An Iadustry-Driven Approach to EHS Issues: The NanoSafety
Consortium for Carbon, 7 NANOTECHNOLOGY LAW & BuS. 254, 254 (2010).
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introduced so far in that direction is the Canada-US Regulatory
Cooperation Council Nanotechnology Initiative (RCC). Following the
2011 announcement of Prime Minister Stephen Harper and President
Barack Obama on the creation of the RCC to increase regulatory
transparency and coordination between the two countries in
twenty-nine areas, including nanotechnology, a Joint Action Plan has
been developed.193
Under the command of the Joint Action Plan, the
Nanotechnology Work Plan was developed to "share information
and develop joint approaches on regulatory aspects of
nanomaterials-including terminology and nomenclature, as well as
risk assessment and management."19 4 The Work Plan contains five
work elements: (1) identification of common principles for the
regulation of nanomaterials; (2) identification of common criteria for
determining priority setting; (3) the sharing of best practices for
assessing and managing the risks of nanomaterials; (4) identification
of gaps and priorities for future information gathering; and
(5) development of a model framework for regulating products and
applications of emerging technologies with respect to potential
impacts on the environment, human health, food or agriculture.195 As
of September 2013, efforts are still underway to implement the Work
Plan, and it is too early to comment on the effectiveness of this
initiative.
VI. CONCLUSION
The trends presented in this Article indicate a self-organizing
structure of global nanotechnology regulation. Rather than showing a
pure risk-based legal logic for a governmental strategic approach to
regulation, they suggest that a combination of economic, political and
social factors (such as public pressure and market competitiveness)
drove the development of GNRIs. GNRIs involve powerful private
actors that have created original norms that stimulate national and
transnational policies. These norms are in no way more fuzzy or less
specialized than the equivalent ones developed under public
standard-setting process, but they are more adaptive to change. In
addition, private GNRIs also help diffuse public policies around the
193. Joint Statement by President Obama and Prime Minister Harper of Canada on
Regulatory Cooperation, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Feb. 4, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/us-canada_recjoint-action plan3.pdf.
194. David Morin et al., Canada-US Regulatory Cooperation Council Nanotechnology
Initiative: Introduction & Background, slide 13 (2013), http://nanotech.lawbc.com/
uploads/file/00105620.PDF.
195. Id. at slide 14.
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world, hence taking a prominent part in shaping supranational
regulatory norms.
As the nanotechnology industry has moved forward, the GNRI
landscape has become more dense and globalized. Since 2008, we
have seen an increase in public regulatory activities, which have
gradually moved toward more mandatory market controls and risk
management requirements. Still, taking into consideration current
conditions of scientific uncertainty, the risk-based approach to
regulation that is largely adopted by governments might not be
sufficient (or even desirable) to oversee the development of emerging
technologies.
To date, the focus has mostly been devoted to workplace
exposure. This was the most logical first step-as historically,
workers have been first to be exposed to new environmental risks.
However, as technology evolves, regulation is likely to penetrate other
environmental media such as air, water and soil. Furthermore, more
attention is likely to be given to the entire life cycle of the product,
including its disposal as well as the manufacturing and processing
stages. The historical path of regulatory development in other
emerging technologies, such as the Internet, shows that formal
regulation eventually catches up with practical needs. As the field
grows and matures, formal regulation becomes more dense and
detailed. However, it is possible that due to unique aspects of
nanotechnology, its development will still be motivated primarily by
self-regulation and other soft law mechanisms that allow greater
flexibility (supplemented by professional judgment) when
implemented.
Despite the relative success of the few established
public-private partnerships, few such initiatives have been developed
over the years. Several explanations can be offered for this state of
affairs: first, governments like to stay independent; second,
governments are slow to respond, whereas businesses stay ahead of
important developments; and third, there is a lack of trust between
governments and businesses resulting in the other side not taking
advantage of the partnership arrangements and output. Whatever
the reason, partnership in the field of nanotechnology seems to focus
on issues underlying regulation, such as developing test methods for
risk assessments and validation of control measures, rather than on
directly shaping the regulatory approach. Such collaborations are
likely to continue in the future as this field continues to grow and new
methods for risk assessment and management of the emerging
materials are developed. Nevertheless, it is the author's view that
institutionalized hybrid forms of governance are unlikely to emerge in
this field.
2014] 167
168 VAND. J ENT. & TECH. L. [Vol. 17:1:107
Any theory attempting to explain the GNRI landscape should
focus on the constant dialogue between public and private regulation.
In order to understand these dynamics, it is not enough to look at each
of the initiatives as an autonomous and isolated unit. It is important
to analyze how information has moved around the globe and how
public and private actors have interacted in shaping supranational
norms. This area of study requires additional investigation.
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